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ADAPTABLE DUE PROCESS 
JASON PARKIN† 
The requirements of procedural due process must adapt to our constantly 
changing world.  Over thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court in 
Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge adopted what appears to be a 
dynamic, fact-intensive approach to determining the procedures required by the 
Due Process Clause.  Federal, state, and local government agencies responded by 
establishing new procedural safeguards, many of which are virtually identical 
to those in use today.  Yet, for public benefits programs such as welfare, the in-
tervening decades have brought striking changes.  The 1996 federal welfare law 
created new and powerful incentives to trim the rolls.  Work requirements in-
creased the proportion of recipients holding jobs, forcing many to choose between 
forgoing their due process rights and jeopardizing their employment by missing 
work to attend a hearing.  Technological advances enabled welfare agencies to 
cut off benefits based on automated eligibility determinations that are difficult 
for recipients to challenge.  Cuts in funding for legal services made the prospect 
of legal representation at fair hearings remote. 
These new facts and circumstances undermine the effectiveness of existing 
procedures and may require reweighing the Mathews factors to determine what 
process is due to welfare recipients.  Such changes are not unique to welfare; the 
facts and circumstances relevant to many of the procedural safeguards estab-
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lished since the due process revolution will evolve in the years to come, if they 
have not already.  Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether or 
how existing procedures should be adapted to such changes, adapting the de-
mands of due process to new facts and circumstances is faithful to constitutional 
doctrine and necessary to ensure that existing procedures continue to provide 
due process of law.  It also provides an opportunity to reinvigorate a conversa-
tion about procedural justice that went silent many years ago. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Will due process keep up with our rapidly changing world?  Can 
procedures that satisfied due process at one point in time become  
unconstitutional when the facts and circumstances change?  The an-
swer would seem to be yes.  As the Supreme Court has emphasized in 
case after case, “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.”1  Yet, in the thirty-five 
years since adopting a fact-intensive balancing approach to procedural 
due process in Mathews v. Eldridge,2 the Court has not assessed whether 
changed circumstances can render unconstitutional a set of procedural 
protections that it previously held to satisfy the dictates of due process. 
Whether the Mathews approach can account for changes over time 
is not a mere footnote to the due process guarantee contained in the 
Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.3  The world has 
 
1 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).  As the Court explained in 
Morrissey, this proposition “has been said so often by this Court and others as not to 
require citation of authority.”  Id.  The Court has quoted this langugage in numerous 
decisions since Morrissey.  See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005); Gilbert 
v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 
1, 15 n.15 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); see also Connecticut v. 
Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (“[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“The very nature of due process negates any 
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.”). 
2 424 U.S. at 334-35.  In Mathews, the Court held that three factors must be 
considered when determining the “specific dictates” of due process:  (1) “the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that 
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”  Id. at 335. 
3 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law” either by the states (through the Fourteenth Amendment) or by the 
federal government (through the Fifth Amendment).  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
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changed in ways unimaginable to the judges, government officials, and 
advocates responsible for shaping the procedural protections currently 
in place, and the future is certain to bring changes of unforeseeable 
variety and magnitude.  Unless existing procedural safeguards are 
adapted to whatever changes the future will bring, individuals facing 
governmental deprivations will be threatened with violations of their 
right to due process of law. 
An example spanning twenty-three years, three federal lawsuits, and 
the evolution of one state’s debt collection procedures reveals what can 
be at stake when courts consider the adaptability of due process: 
In July 1983, Cynthia McCahey, a mother of three children and a 
recipient of welfare benefits, discovered that her checking account 
had been frozen pursuant to New York’s debt collection procedures.4  
McCahey’s account was frozen even though it contained only her wel-
fare benefits, which state law exempted from seizure by debt collec-
tors.5  Left with only post-seizure remedies, McCahey was not able to 
regain access to her account until four-and-a-half months had passed.6  
During that time, “she fell behind in her rent and utility payments” 
and “skimped on food and clothing” for her family.7 
McCahey brought suit in federal court arguing that New York’s 
debt collection procedures violated due process because they lacked 
pre-seizure procedural protections.  The case reached the Second 
Circuit, which applied the Mathews balancing test to the freezing of 
bank accounts that contained only money exempt from seizure and 
concluded that New York’s procedures struck “a fair balance between 
the competing interests” and therefore satisfied due process.8  The 
pre-seizure process sought by McCahey was not mandated by due  
process, the court explained, because of the risk that debtors would 
conceal assets.9  As a result of the McCahey decision, recipients of sub-
 
4 McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1985). 
5 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 137 (McKinney 2003) (“All moneys or orders granted 
to persons as public assistance . . . shall be inalienable by any assignment or transfer 
and shall be exempt from levy and execution under the laws of this state.”).  
6 McCahey, 774 F.2d at 546. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 549-50.  According to the Second Circuit, New York’s procedures satisfied 
due process because they provided debtors with post-seizure notice including, notice of 
exemptions to which they may be entitled, and a prompt opportunity to challenge the 
seizure and assert their exemptions.  Id. at 549 (citing Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 
F. Supp. 1178, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
9 Id. at 550. 
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sistence benefits were left with no choice but to wait until their money 
was seized before trying to reclaim it, even though state law exempted 
the funds from ever being seized in the first place. 
Seventeen years later, on October 27, 2000, Bernie Huggins’s bank 
account was frozen pursuant to the same debt collection procedures 
held to be constitutional in McCahey.10  The only funds in Huggins’s 
account were his monthly Social Security disability benefits,11 which, 
like McCahey’s welfare benefits, were exempt from seizure.12  Huggins 
brought a federal lawsuit claiming that New York’s procedures violated 
due process.  Not surprisingly, the defendants immediately moved to 
dismiss the case, arguing that McCahey controlled and that Huggins’s 
due process claim failed as a matter of law.13 
Huggins contended that McCahey was not dispositive because the 
facts and circumstances had changed in ways that altered the Mathews 
balancing undertaken by the Second Circuit in 1985.14  Unlike the 
paper welfare checks deposited by McCahey, Huggins’s benefits were 
deposited directly into his bank account and electronically tagged in a 
manner that clearly identified the funds as disability benefits.15  Ac-
cording to Huggins, this shift tipped the balance in favor of an addi-
tional procedural safeguard:  requiring the bank to determine whether 
an account contained electronically deposited exempt benefits before 
freezing it.16  Tracing the source of funds in a bank account would 
have been overly burdensome in 1985, but Huggins argued that the 
advent of direct deposit enabled banks to quickly and easily determine 
if an account contained only exempt money. 
The district court refused to reevaluate the Mathews factors in light 
of the changed circumstances.17  Although it acknowledged that Hug-
gins raised “valid concerns about the advisability” of the challenged pro-
cedures and that the Second Circuit “may be inclined to reconsider” 
 
10 Huggins v. Pataki, No. 01-CV-3016, 2002 WL 1732804, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002). 
11 Id.  In fact, Huggins maintained the account solely for the purpose of receiving his 
disability benefits via electronic transfer from the Social Security Administration.  Id. 
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2006) (“[N]one of the moneys paid or payable or rights 
existing under this subchapter [Social Security benefits] shall be subject to execution, 
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any 
bankruptcy or insolvency law.”).   




17 Id. at *4. 
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McCahey, the court concluded that “McCahey is binding authority, and I 
am obliged to apply that authority.”18  Huggins appealed to the Second 
Circuit, but he died before oral argument and the case was dismissed 
on August 18, 2003.19 
The issue did not stay out of the courts for long.  On November 19, 
2003, Dennis Mayers brought another challenge to the law, making 
virtually the same argument as Huggins.20  Mayers, who was later 
joined by two other plaintiffs,21 filed his case in the same courthouse 
where Huggins’s case was heard, but it was assigned to a different  
district judge.  This time, the district court held that McCahey did not 
mandate dismissal.22  
Invoking the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that due process “is 
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place, and circumstances,”23 the district court took up the Mathews bal-
ancing anew and concluded that the procedures approved by McCahey 
no longer satisfied due process in light of subsequent technological 
and policy developments.24  In particular, the court emphasized that 
the additional procedural safeguard sought by the plaintiffs—
requiring banks to determine, prior to freezing an account, that the 
account does not contain only electronically deposited exempt 
 
18 Id.  The court also presciently remarked that “[p]erhaps arguments directed to 
the state legislature will produce a change in the law.”  Id. 
19  Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, Huggins v. Pataki, No. 02-7950 (2d Cir. Aug. 
18, 2003). 
20 Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., No. 03-CV-5837, 2005 WL 2105810, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005).  Mayers’s bank account contained his Social Security 
disability benefits, which were exempt from seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).  Id. 
at *2-3.  In the interest of full disclosure, I was one of the attorneys representing the 
plaintiffs in Mayers. 
21 The two additional plaintiffs were Nancy Ciccone and Elba Quinones, both of 
whom had their bank accounts frozen even though those accounts contained only 
benefits that were exempt from seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).  Mayers, 2005 
WL 2105810, at *3-4. 
22 Id. at *12-13. 
23 Id. at *13 (quoting Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991)). 
24 Id. at *14.  As to the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the 
court found that two post-McCahey changes increased the potential for risk:  the Social 
Security Administration’s 1998 requirement that benefit recipients receive payments 
electronically, and technological developments that made it easier for creditors to serve 
restraining notices on banks.  Id. at *13-14.  As to the third Mathews factor, the 
government’s interest, the court found that the additional procedural protections 
sought by the plaintiffs implicated the government’s interest because the procedures 
would reduce the number of costly proceedings initiated in state court and “promote a 
more efficient use of judicial resources.”  Id. at *14. 
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funds—would impose only a “negligible” cost relative to the benefit it 
would produce.25  The case proceeded in the district court until No-
vember 26, 2008, when it was mooted by statutory amendments to New 
York’s debt collection procedures that effectively prevented banks 
from freezing accounts containing only exempt funds.26 
The McCahey-Huggins -Mayers example involves a narrow issue aris-
ing out of one state’s debt collection procedures, but it exposes im-
portant questions about the adaptability of due process.  What types of 
changes can undermine the constitutionality of procedures previously 
deemed to satisfy due process?  How should courts respond to claims 
that new facts and new circumstances affect the constitutionality of 
existing procedures?  As the Huggins and Mayers decisions demon-
strate, judges considering identical due process claims based on iden-
tical facts can arrive at conflicting answers, with very different 
consequences for the individuals and government agencies whose in-
terests are under consideration. 
 
*      *      * 
 
This Article examines the adaptability of due process through the 
lens of the most commonly used—and perhaps the most iconic—
procedural safeguard in existence today:  the right to a fair hearing.  
Since 1970, when the Supreme Court ruled in Goldberg v. Kelly that wel-
fare recipients must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard at 
a fair hearing prior to termination of their benefits,27 the right to a fair 
hearing has served as the central element of due process when an in-
dividual’s eligibility for public benefits is at issue.  Indeed, in the years 
following Goldberg, federal, state, and local agencies established fair 
hearing systems for a wide range of public benefits in addition to wel-
fare, including food stamps,28 Medicaid,29 and Supplemental Security 
 
25 Id. at *13. 
26 See Exempt Income Protection Act of 2008, § 3, 2008 N.Y. Laws 4085, 4088 
(codified as amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222(h) (MCKINNEY Supp. 2012)) (directing 
that “if direct deposit or electronic payments [are] reasonably identifiable as statutorily 
exempt payments,” then banks shall not restrain $2500 in the account, and if there is 
less than $2500 in the account, the “account shall not be restrained” at all). 
27 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970). 
28 See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (2006) (establishing a right to a fair hearing to 
challenge adverse food stamp eligibility determinations); 7 C.F.R. § 273.15 (2011) 
(detailing the food stamp program’s fair hearing mandate). 
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Income,30 among others.31  For the millions of individuals who have 
received public benefits since the 1970s, the fair hearing system estab-
lished in the wake of Goldberg and Mathews represents the real-world 
legacy of the Supreme Court’s due process revolution. 
The emergence of the right to a fair hearing effectively halted fur-
ther evolution of what a public benefits recipient’s “opportunity to be 
heard” entails.  Today, decades after Goldberg, the fair hearings availa-
ble to public benefits recipients look almost identical to those put into 
place in the 1970s.32  Not all aspects of public benefits programs have 
remained frozen in time, of course.  But even where the statutes and 
regulations underlying a benefits program have been radically altered 
or simply discarded and rewritten—as was the case with the 1996 fed-
eral welfare law33—the procedures for challenging terminations of 
those benefits remain virtually indistinguishable from those put into 
place many years ago. 
Scholarly interest in the due process rights of public benefits recip-
ients has followed a similar arc over the past forty years.  After the  
Supreme Court’s decision in Goldberg, procedural due process and the 
right to a fair hearing captured the attention of scholars of constitu-
tional law, administrative law, and the then-emerging field of poverty 
law.  The years between Goldberg and Mathews saw lively debates  
over which administrative procedures satisfied due process, while  
post-Mathews the conversation turned toward critiques of the Mathews 
approach and the procedures it required.34  This spike in interest sub-
 
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (mandating state provision of “an opportunity for a 
fair hearing . . . to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under the plan is 
denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness”); 42 C.F.R. §§  431.220–.223 
(detailing the right to a hearing).  
30 See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) (establishing a right to a fair hearing to challenge benefit 
eligibility or amount determinations “in whole or in part unfavorable” to the 
applicant); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1429–416.1461 (detailing the hearing process).  
31 Other public benefits programs with fair hearing requirements include the 
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) supplemental nutrition program.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1786(f)(8)(a) (granting fair hearing rights to aggrieved parties); 7 C.F.R. § 246.9 
(describing the hearing right). 
32 Although the contours of “the opportunity to be heard” have remained fixed for 
public benefits recipients since Goldberg, other aspects of recipients’ due process rights 
continued to evolve during the 1970s and early 1980s.  See infra note 116. 
33 In the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended primarily in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), lawmakers brushed aside the existing welfare law and 
replaced it with an entirely new program.  See infra Section II.A. 
34 See infra Section I.C. 
Parkin FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)  4/10/2012 5:59 PM 
2012] Adaptable Due Process 1317 
 
sided in the 1980s:  having registered their views on Goldberg’s fair 
hearing right and Mathews’s cost-benefit approach to procedural due 
process, legal academics shifted their focus elsewhere as this intersec-
tion of constitutional law and administrative procedure was no longer 
undergoing the dramatic developments of the prior decade. 
With a stable legal doctrine, an ossified set of procedural protec-
tions, and a lack of recent attention from legal scholars, it might ap-
pear that there is little left to say about procedural due process and the 
right to a fair hearing.  Yet public benefits programs have evolved in 
unanticipated ways since the Supreme Court ruled on the due process 
rights of welfare recipients decades ago.35  The 1996 federal welfare 
law fundamentally altered the administration of welfare, introducing 
strong incentives to trim the rolls, a new emphasis on discretionary 
decisionmaking, and new opportunities for privatization.36  Technolog-
ical advances have enabled welfare agencies to process applications 
and issue benefits more quickly, while at the same time increased reli-
ance on automation has led to erroneous terminations that are diffi-
cult to challenge.37  Welfare work requirements have increased the 
proportion of recipients holding jobs while collecting benefits, forcing 
many to choose between forgoing their due process rights and poten-
tially jeopardizing their employment by missing work to appear at a 
hearing.38  Cuts in funding for legal services have made the prospect of 
free legal representation at fair hearings remote.39  By undermining 
many of the factual assumptions that originally justified the right to a 
fair hearing, these changes in the facts and circumstances of welfare 
programs and welfare recipients have increased the risk that benefits 
will be erroneously terminated. 
This Article argues that the demands of due process must adapt to 
changing facts and circumstances.  Importantly, I do not suggest that 
the Mathews approach be abandoned in favor of some other method of 
determining whether specific procedures satisfy due process of law.  
Numerous scholars have proposed alternatives to the Mathews approach, 
and many of those proposals remain compelling today.40  Instead, by 
examining changes in the context of welfare, this Article considers 
 
35 See infra Part II. 
36 See infra Section II.A. 
37 See infra Section II.C. 
38 See infra subsection II.B.1. 
39 See infra subsection II.B.2. 
40 See infra Section I.C. 
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when such changes require a reweighing of the Mathews factors, which 
in turn may result in due process dictating a different set of procedures. 
The notion that changes in facts and circumstances could require 
reevaluation of the Mathews factors may seem obvious, but the Supreme 
Court has not directly addressed whether or how such a reevaluation 
should take place.  Nor have legal scholars examined how to apply 
Mathews when procedures that once satisfied due process may no longer 
do so.  It is almost as if a procedural regime that has been established in 
accordance with Mathews is considered final and no longer worthy of 
constitutional scrutiny.  Indeed, aside from the Huggins and Mayers deci-
sions discussed above, due process challenges based on changing facts 
and circumstances appear to be absent from the post-Mathews case law. 
This Article’s examination of the adaptability of procedural due 
process provides an essential supplement to the due process analysis 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Mathews.  By identifying changes 
relevant to the due process calculation and by providing a doctrinal 
basis for taking these changes into account when determining whether 
existing procedures continue to satisfy due process, this Article out-
lines an approach to procedural due process that is faithful to current 
doctrine and adaptable to changes that arise in the years and decades 
after a procedural system is put into place. 
Part I of this Article outlines the current state of procedural due 
process doctrine and the right to a fair hearing.  It begins by providing 
an overview of the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence as it 
relates to government benefits programs, with a focus on the due pro-
cess revolution of the 1970s and the Court’s decisions in Goldberg and 
Mathews.  It then explains how local, state, and federal agencies re-
sponded to these doctrinal developments, with particular emphasis on 
the evolution of the welfare fair hearing system.  Finally, Part I reviews 
the scholarly critiques of Goldberg’s right to a fair hearing and Mathews’s 
cost-benefit approach to procedural due process, as well as recent legal 
scholarship on procedural due process in the administrative state. 
Part II identifies aspects of welfare that have undergone significant 
changes since the Supreme Court established the right to a fair hear-
ing in 1970.  This Part examines (1) changes in incentives to terminate 
benefits, including new funding mechanisms, shifts toward discretion-
ary decisionmaking, and the rise of privatization; (2) changes in the 
circumstances of welfare recipients, including the increased propor-
tion of recipients holding jobs while collecting benefits and the  
decreased availability of legal representation at fair hearings; and 
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(3) changes in technology, including the rise of automated eligibility 
determinations and computerized case management systems.  For each 
of these categories, the changes represent a significant departure from 
the facts and circumstances in existence (or understood to be in exist-
ence) in the 1970s, and those changes have created procedural needs 
that did not exist when Goldberg was decided.  Furthermore, because 
these changes affect one or more of the Mathews factors, they call into 
question whether the procedural safeguard demanded by due process 
in 1970—the right to a fair hearing—continues to satisfy due  
process today. 
Part III explores how courts should respond to claims that chang-
ing facts and circumstances undermine the constitutionality of proce-
dural safeguards previously deemed to satisfy due process.  After 
noting the lack of clear precedent on this point, this Part revisits the 
McCahey -Huggins -Mayers example and identifies different paths that 
could be taken in response to such challenges.  Then, through a close 
examination of the Supreme Court’s procedural due process case law, 
this Part argues that an approach to procedural due process that ac-
counts for new facts and circumstances is faithful to established doc-
trine.  Returning to the welfare context, this Part identifies procedural 
innovations that respond to the new needs of welfare recipients identi-
fied in Part II.  This Part then considers the limits of the right to a fair 
hearing and suggests alternative approaches to achieving procedural 
fairness in the administration of welfare programs.  I conclude by ar-
guing that adapting the demands of due process to changing facts and 
circumstances is not only necessary to ensure that existing procedures 
continue to withstand constitutional scrutiny, but it also provides an 
opportunity, four decades after the due process revolution, to reinvig-
orate procedural due process for a rapidly changing world. 
I.  FROM REVOLUTION TO STAGNATION:  GOLDBERG, MATHEWS, 
AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING 
Two Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s altered the reach and 
requirements of due process in fundamental ways.  In Goldberg v. Kelly, 
the Court expanded the scope of what counts as “property” under the 
Due Process Clause and held that welfare recipients have a right to a 
fair hearing before the government terminates their welfare benefits.41  
 
41 See 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); see also id. at 264  (“[O]nly a pre-termination 
evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process.”). 
Parkin FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)  4/10/2012 5:59 PM 
1320 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1309 
 
Goldberg touched off a “due process explosion” in which procedural 
due process requirements were extended to cover many types of gov-
ernment action unrelated to welfare terminations.42  Then, six years 
after deciding Goldberg, the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge adopted what 
remains the general approach for determining what process is due 
when the government seeks to deprive an individual of a constitution-
ally protected interest.43 
This Part outlines the current state of procedural due process and 
the right to a welfare fair hearing.  Beginning with the Court’s decisions 
in Goldberg and Mathews, it traces the evolution of due process doctrine 
in the context of welfare terminations.  It then explains how local, state, 
and federal agencies responded to these doctrinal developments, with 
particular emphasis on the evolution of the welfare fair hearing system.  
Finally, this Part reviews the scholarly critiques of Goldberg, Mathews, 
and the right to a fair hearing, as well as the more recent legal scholar-
ship on procedural due process in the administrative state. 
A.  Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge 
The due process revolution of the 1970s began with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly.44  With Justice Brennan writing for 
the seven-member majority, the Court first held that welfare benefits 
are a form of property subject to due process protections.45  This hold-
 
42 Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975); 
see also id. (“[T]he Court has carried the hearing requirement from one new area of 
government action to another.”).  This explosion led to a sharp increase in due process 
litigation.  See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 9-10 
(1985) (noting that “federal court complaints of procedural due process deprivation in 
the 1970s showed a 350 percent increase over the 1960s,” compared to a seventy 
percent increase in federal civil litigation of all kinds). 
43 See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (listing three factors to be considered in deciding 
what due process requires in a given situation). 
44 See MASHAW, supra note 42, at 33 (“[B]y most accounts the due process 
revolution began with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly . . . .”).  
45 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court invoked the 
concept of “new property.”  See id. at 262 n.8 (advocating recognition of “welfare 
entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity’” despite the fact that they “do not 
fall within traditional common-law concepts of property” (citing Charles A. Reich, 
Individual Rights and Social Welfare:  The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 
(1965))); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)).  The idea that 
welfare recipients have a “right” to benefits was initially promoted by social workers and 
lawyers working within the federal social welfare bureaucracy in the years immediately 
following passage of the Social Security Act of 1935.  See Karen M. Tani, Welfare and 
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ing represented a significant expansion of the definition of “property,” 
as that term is used in the Constitution.46  Goldberg thus provided sup-
port for extending due process protections previously afforded only 
to deprivations of traditional forms of property to many other gov-
ernmental actions.47 
After ruling that welfare was a constitutionally protected property 
interest, the Court proceeded to hold that recipients are entitled to a 
hearing before, not after, their benefits are terminated.48  The Court 
justified its demand for pretermination procedures by highlighting the 
importance of welfare benefits to recipients49 and to society at large.50  
Turning to the contours of the hearing, the Court emphasized that the 
procedures must be “adapted to the particular characteristics of wel-
fare recipients, and to the limited nature of the controversies to be 
resolved,”51 and that the hearing “must be tailored to the capacities 
and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”52  Mindful of these 
considerations, the Court held that, in the welfare context, due pro-
 
Rights Before the Movement:  Rights as Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2012) (manuscript at 17-25) (on file with author). 
46 Although the government defendant and the United States as amicus did not 
dispute that due process applied in Goldberg, “because Justice Brennan goes beyond the 
parties’ concession to explain why due process applies to welfare termination, the 
opinion is now read as setting the Court on the path of modern due process doctrine.”  
PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  CASES AND 
COMMENTS 791 (10th ed. rev. 2003).  
47 See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Albert H. Meyerhoff & Jeffrey A. 
Mishkin, Application of Goldberg v. Kelly Hearing Requirements to Termination of Social 
Security Benefits, 26 STAN. L. REV. 549, 550-51 (1974) (“Once [due process] 
protections . . . were extended to the deprivation of welfare benefits, there were 
other obvious targets.”). 
48 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. 
49 According to the Court, the “crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination 
of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible 
recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.”  Id. at 264.  The Court 
recognized that “welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, 
and medical care.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  It further noted that without benefits, a 
recipient must “concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, [which] 
adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy.”  Id. (footnote 
omitted).   
50 The Court explained that uninterrupted provision of welfare benefits to eligible 
recipients serves important governmental interests, including enabling the poor “to 
participate meaningfully in the life of the community” and guarding against “the 
societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and 
insecurity.”  Id. at 265. 
51 Id. at 267. 
52 Id. at 268-69 (footnote omitted). 
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cess requires a pretermination hearing consisting of the following min-
imum procedural safeguards:  notice detailing the reasons for the 
proposed termination;53 the opportunity at the hearing to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses, to present oral arguments, and to be rep-
resented by counsel;54 and adjudication by an impartial decisionmaker.55 
Six years after Goldberg, the Court decided a case that looked in 
many respects quite similar.  In Mathews v. Eldridge, the plaintiff relied 
on Goldberg’s pretermination hearing requirement to argue that the 
discontinuation of his Social Security disability benefits without a 
pretermination hearing violated the Due Process Clause.56  The Court 
rejected the claim, distinguishing disability benefits from welfare bene-
fits and holding that the post-deprivation procedures available to re-
cipients of disability benefits were sufficient to satisfy due process.57 
In reaching its holding in Mathews, the Court adopted a new ap-
proach to determining what procedures are required by the Due Pro-
cess Clause when the government seeks to deprive an individual of a 
constitutionally protected interest:   
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
consideration of three distinct factors:  First, the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.58  
The Mathews Court’s cost-benefit approach to procedural due 
process represented a significant departure from the analysis used in 
Goldberg.  Yet Mathews left untouched Goldberg’s central holding, and it 
quoted with approval Goldberg’s view that procedures must be “tai-
lored . . . to ‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be 
heard,’ to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to pre-
 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 269-70. 
55 Id. at 271. 
56 424 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1976). 
57 The Court identified the following differences as relevant to its determination:  
eligibility for disability benefits is not based upon financial need, id. at 340; other forms 
of government assistance are available when the termination of disability benefits 
places an individual or his family below the subsistence level, id. at 342; and the risk of 
error is substantially lower than in the welfare context, id. at 344-45. 
58 Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-71). 
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sent their case.”59  And despite fears that the Mathews decision laid the 
foundation for a disavowal of Goldberg’s right to a pretermination fair 
hearing, the Court has continued to cite Goldberg in decisions involving 
due process claims.60  
B.  Implementation of the Due Process Revolution and  
the Right to a Fair Hearing 
In response to the Supreme Court’s rulings in Goldberg and 
Mathews, federal, state, and local administrative agencies adjusted 
existing procedures and created new ones in order to satisfy the re-
quirements of due process.  In the context of welfare benefits, agen-
cies adopted procedures matching those articulated in Goldberg.  For 
other types of property interests, agencies looked to Goldberg, and later 
to Mathews, to design the requisite procedural safeguards.  The hall-
mark of those procedures was the fair hearing.   
Government agencies were not altogether unfamiliar with fair hear-
ings prior to Goldberg.  Indeed, some public benefits programs made 
hearings available to individuals challenging benefit terminations well 
before Goldberg.61  The Social Security Act of 1935 included a provision 
requiring states to offer hearings to beneficiaries of Aid to Dependent 
Children62 (later renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children63).  
Congress included similarly worded hearing requirements when it 
 
59 Id. at 349 (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268-69). 
60 See, for example, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 
U.S. 40, 60 (1999), which cites both Goldberg and Mathews in determining whether an 
individual has a property interest in state medical benefits. 
61 See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration:  Rules, Discretion, and 
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1191 (2000) (“[T]he idea of using 
hearings in public benefit programs as a means of correcting errors in individual cases 
long predates the decision in [Goldberg].”). 
62 See Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 402(a)(4), 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935) (repealed 1996) 
(requiring that state plans for the Aid to Dependent Children program to “provide for 
granting to any individual, whose claim with respect to aid to a dependent child is 
denied, an opportunity for a fair hearing before such State agency”); see also A. 
Delafield Smith, Public Assistance as a Social Obligation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 266, 268 (1949) 
(“All three of the federal [public assistance] titles require the state, as one of the 
conditions of the federal grants, to give the applicant the opportunity of a fair hearing 
before the state administrative agency.” (footnotes omitted)).  See generally Tani, supra 
note 45 (manuscript at 21-25) (describing discussions during 1935 and 1936 among 
lawyers working within the federal social welfare bureaucracy concerning the meaning of 
the Social Security Act’s fair hearing provision). 
63 See infra note 124.  
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established the Medicaid program in 196564 and modified the food 
stamp program in 1977.65  Yet public benefits recipients rarely requested 
fair hearings until the late 1960s,66 when hearings became a focal point 
for the nascent welfare rights organizing movement and federally 
funded legal services attorneys began representing significant num-
bers of welfare applicants and recipients.67 
The welfare fair hearing systems that arose during the 1970s hewed 
closely to the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Goldberg.68  
 
64 See Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 
Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (Supp. III 2010)) 
(requiring that state plans for medical assistance “provide for granting an opportunity 
for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical 
assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness”). 
65 See Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 11(e)(10), 91 Stat. 913, 972 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (2006)) (requiring that a state plan of 
operation provide for a “fair hearing and prompt determination thereafter to any 
household aggrieved by the action of the State agency”). 
66 See FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS:  POLITICS AND 
POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 70 (2007) (“Fair hearings were rarely used by clients of 
public assistance in the thirty years after passage of the Social Security Act.”); FRANCES 
FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR:  THE FUNCTIONS OF 
PUBLIC WELFARE 173 (2d ed. 1993) (“In 1964, when the over-all welfare rolls stood at 
about 500,000 persons in New York City, a mere fifteen appeals were taken in an entire 
year.”); see also William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights:  A History, Critique and 
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1857 (2001) (noting that the fair hearing 
provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 “had been dormant for the Act’s first thirty 
years”); Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement After Welfare Reform:  Are Fair Hearings the 
Cure?, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 13, 31-32 (2005) (discussing the extremely 
limited use of fair hearings prior to Goldberg). 
67 See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 73 (stating that in the mid-1960s, “[f]air 
hearings became an integral part of the strategy of the [New York City] and national 
welfare rights movements”).  The number of fair hearings held per year in New York 
State reflects the growing use of fair hearings.  There were 188 fair hearings in New 
York State in 1964, that number rose to 650 in 1966, and 4233 in 1967, when 
requesting fair hearings became a central element of the welfare rights strategy in New 
York City.  Id.   
68 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Reality of Procedural Due Process—A Study of the 
Implementation of Fair Hearing Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, 13 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 725, 733 (1972) (explaining that the federal hearing requirements adopted 
shortly after Goldberg “incorporate[d] the Goldberg guidelines by providing the claimant 
with the opportunity to present his position orally, to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, [and] to be represented by counsel or other spokesmen,” and also 
established “the necessity for an impartial decision maker” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
Cesar A. Perales, The Fair Hearings Process:  Guardian of the Social Service System, 56 
BROOK. L. REV. 889, 889-96 (1990) (discussing New York State’s implementation of 
Goldberg’s fair hearing requirement).  But see DANIEL J. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY 
AND MASS ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 18-23 (1974) (noting that some jurisdictions 
resisted the new fair hearing requirements). 
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The hearings were adversarial and were presided over by an impartial 
decisionmaker.  Both welfare recipients and representatives of the wel-
fare agency had the opportunity to present documentary and testimo-
nial evidence.  Judges based their decisions on the record created at 
the hearing.  Fair hearings therefore resembled mini-trials, with a writ-
ten decision that parties typically could appeal to some higher level of 
authority. 
Goldberg’s influence extended well beyond welfare fair hearings, as 
its rationale for classifying welfare benefits as a property right was ex-
tended to other benefits conferred by the government.69  Thus, a wide 
range of benefits programs administered by federal, state, and local 
agencies were understood to be “new property” and subject to Gold-
berg’s fair hearing requirement.70  Some statutory and administrative 
regimes even mandated fair hearing–like procedures in areas where 
due process may not have required them to do so.71 
So too has Mathews had an impact far beyond the narrow question 
presented in that case.  According to the Supreme Court, Mathews 
offers “a general approach” for testing challenged procedures under a 
due process claim.72  The Court has subsequently applied Mathews’s 
three-factor analysis in a variety of contexts unrelated to public bene-
 
69 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1977-78 (1996) (“In a single opinion the Court transformed 
welfare, and potentially all other forms of government benefits, from a mere privilege 
completely unprotected by due process to a property right subject to the most stringent 
procedural safeguards available in the United States legal system.”).   
70 See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION:  AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, 
BUREAUCRACY 21 (1986) (“Goldberg v. Kelly struck a responsive chord and was picked 
up in many statutory and administrative schemes—welfare, Social Security, disability, 
mental health, education.”); see also supra notes 28-31. 
71 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 61, at 1191 (“The reliance on hearings is so ingrained 
that Congress has provided for pretermination hearings even in situations in which the 
Court has concluded that they are not required by due process.”).  For example, 
“Congress provided for [a right to a pretermination hearing] in the context of Social 
Security disability benefits, even though the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge held that the 
Due Process Clause did not prohibit the Social Security Administration from 
terminating benefits prior to holding a hearing.”  Id. at 1191 n.365 (citations omitted); 
cf. HANDLER, supra note 70, at 21 (“Many areas of relationships between clients and 
agencies are governed by statutory and administrative procedural schemes that were 
adopted during the Goldberg v. Kelly era, but are now no longer constitutionally 
required.”). 
72 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979).  But cf. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 
U.S. 161, 167-68 (2002) (declining to use the Mathews approach to evaluate a due 
process challenge to the adequacy of a method of giving notice, and observing that “we 
have never viewed Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due 
process claims”). 
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fits terminations, including terminations of parental rights,73 involun-
tary civil commitments to mental hospitals,74 civil forfeitures,75 deten-
tion of citizens as enemy combatants,76 immigration deportation 
proceedings,77 and terminations of public employment.78  The Court 
has even used the Mathews balancing approach to analyze claims under 
the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.79 
C.  Praise and Criticism of the Right to a Fair Hearing 
While federal, state, and local agencies assessed their obligations 
under the Court’s evolving understanding of procedural due process, 
legal scholars began to consider the changes to due process doctrine 
ushered in by Goldberg and Mathews.  Between 1970 and 1990, scholars 
of constitutional, administrative, and poverty law explored many as-
pects of Goldberg’s right to a fair hearing, including its effect on the 
welfare rights movement, its ability to protect individual rights, and its 
capacity to change the behavior of welfare agencies and caseworkers.  
This debate over procedural justice remains relevant today. 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to a fair hearing was 
initially hailed as a major victory for welfare recipients and the welfare 
rights movement.80  Securing the right to a pretermination fair hearing 
was an important element of the organizing campaign around poverty 
issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s.81  At its most basic level, the 
fair hearing right provided protection for claimants who talked back to 
 
73 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-68 (1982). 
74 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979). 
75 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53-61 (1993). 
76 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-35 (2004). 
77 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-37 (1982). 
78 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543-45 (1985). 
79 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781-82 (2008). 
80 See, e.g., Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare (characterizing Goldberg as the 
“leading judicial advance with regard to welfare procedures,” and explaining that 
“Goldberg can be a major tool in aiding organized recipients to deal boldly with the 
welfare departments without fear (or with less fear) of retaliation by cutoff”), in THE 
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS:  WHAT THEY ARE—WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 63, 71-72 
(Norman Dorsen ed., 1971). 
81 Taking the Goldberg case to the Supreme Court was “part and parcel of the 
organizing strategy of the welfare rights movement, designed to amplify the organized 
forces—particularly the organized welfare recipient forces—of the movement.”  Ed 
Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle:  A Friendly 
Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 562 (1984) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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and resisted welfare caseworkers.82  Many in the movement also be-
lieved that fair hearings would be a pressure point for securing more 
generous benefits and a stronger safety net for low-income individuals 
and communities.83  According to historian Felicia Kornbluh, “[F]air 
hearings were a form of ‘legal civil disobedience,’ which was safer than 
a public sit-in or a march on the state welfare office.”84 
On an individual level, the Court’s fair hearing requirement 
marked a shift in the manner in which many welfare recipients inter-
acted with the government and the legal system.  As Sylvia Law ob-
served, poor people in the 1960s not only had “no process . . . but, in a 
fundamental sense, they had no law.”85  Goldberg altered this dynamic.  
Fair hearings enabled welfare recipients to have their demands for 
material aid taken seriously, to claim standing in the legal and political 
life of the postwar United States, and to force their caseworkers to 
listen.86  By allowing welfare recipients to challenge the evidence pre-
 
82 See id. at 563 (“[T]he particular legal right involved a recognition of the fundamental 
human right of the recipient to dissent and resist . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
83 See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 70-87 (describing how fair hearings can “help 
resource-poor social movement groups” and allow “participat[ion] in a respectful 
public forum”).  However, any hope that the legal system could help recipients obtain 
more generous benefits was dashed two weeks after Goldberg was decided, when the 
Court handed down its decision in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).  
According to the Court: 
[T]he intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems present-
ed by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.  
The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of 
welfare administration.  But the Constitution does not empower this Court to 
second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating 
limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.  
Id. at 487 (internal citations omitted); see also Forbath, supra note 66, at 1867 (“[I]n 
Dandridge v. Williams, the Court made plain that generous, justice-seeking statutory 
constructions and formal and procedural protections were as far as it would go in 
‘promoting the general Welfare’ with welfare rights . . . .”).  
84 KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 66.  The fair hearing strategy, and the welfare 
rights movement in general, faded by the early 1970s, when “[t]he rising conservative 
and antiwelfare mood called into question the idea that poor people could gain justice 
and protect their ‘human rights’ by going to court.”  Id. at 175; see also id. at 174 
(explaining that by the mid-1970s, “women and men who participated in welfare rights 
battles were increasingly conscious of the weaknesses of legal strategies such as fair 
hearings”).  
85 Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L. 
REV. 805, 806 (1990). 
86 See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 76 (“When they sought and pursued fair 
hearings, welfare recipients expressed their desires for material aid and for recognition 
as members of the society in which they lived.” (citing Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution 
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sented by the government and to produce their own evidence to op-
pose the termination of benefits, fair hearings provided an opportuni-
ty for recipients to participate in the decisionmaking process in a way 
that was not previously available.87  Moreover, requiring a government 
agency to prove its case before terminating a recipient’s benefits 
showed respect for the humanity and dignity of welfare recipients.88 
 
to Recognition?:  Dilemmas of Justice in a “Postsocialist” Age, in JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS:  
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE “POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION 11, 39 (1997))); David 
J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 288 (1998) 
(“For many benefit recipients, the fair hearing is the only time their claim is treated 
with any seriousness by any state official.”); cf. KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 79 (“The 
fair hearing campaign gave many poor people a taste of the negotiating power that 
wealthier individuals typically gained from raising the threat of litigation and settling 
their cases without going to court.”). 
87 See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 80 (explaining that fair hearings created an 
opportunity for individual recipients to “participate in a respectful public forum that 
recognized their rights”).  Many scholars have argued that fair hearings provide a 
valuable opportunity to participate in administrative decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:  The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 
888-93 (1981) (emphasizing the importance of an individual’s right to participate in 
decisions affecting her in important ways); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational 
Aims in Procedural Due Process (explaining the importance of “process values” such as 
participation in administrative decisionmaking), in DUE PROCESS:  NOMOS XVIII 126, 
127-28 ( J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977); Richard B. Saphire, 
Specifying Due Process Values:  Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 
127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 148-51 (1978) (suggesting a process evaluation method that 
would grant independent significance to due process itself); Robert S. Summers, 
Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 13 (1974) (noting that legal processes should be evaluated for such factors as 
“process value efficacy” in addition to “good result efficacy”). 
As Frank Michelman has explained: 
The individual may have various reasons for wanting an opportunity to discuss 
the decision with the agent.  Some pertain to external consequences:  the indi-
vidual might succeed in persuading the agent away from the harmful action.  
But again a participatory opportunity may also be psychologically important to 
the individual:  to have played a part in, to have made one’s apt contribution 
to, decisions which are about oneself may be counted important even though 
the decision, as it turns out, is the most unfavorable one imaginable and one’s 
efforts have not proved influential. 
Michelman, supra, at 127-28.  
88 See Kennedy, supra note 86, at 287 (noting that hearing rights “are 
significant . . . because they fulfill dignitary values”); Mashaw, supra note 87, at 886-98 
(discussing analyses of due process that focus on “the degree to which decisional 
processes preserve and enhance human dignity and self-respect”); Perales, supra note 
68, at 892 (stating that the “Goldberg promise” is to “afford[] the dignity of being 
listened to, of being taken seriously”).  See generally Diller, supra note 61, at 1203 n.418 
(summarizing the “extensive literature arguing that fair process is a fundamental form 
of respect for humanity”).  
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The Court’s fair hearing requirement was also lauded for its  
potential to promote government accountability.  Following Goldberg, 
welfare caseworkers knew that their decisions were no longer without 
oversight.  Recipients could challenge the decisions and compel the 
agency to identify and turn over the evidence supporting its determi-
nations.  In this sense, the right to a fair hearing was seen as creating 
incentives to improve accuracy in agency decisionmaking.89  In the 
words of Robert Rabin, Goldberg served as “a strong declaration that a 
search for the Right Answer was paramount, and that agencies would 
be required, whatever the literal terms of their statutory mandates, 
to establish processes reducing the risk of error to an absolute  
minimum.”90 
Yet despite the short-term victory and long-term promise repre-
sented by Goldberg, the right to a fair hearing was subject to considera-
ble criticism.91  Some scholars believed the Court’s view of procedural 
due process was unduly narrow.  For example, Judge Henry Friendly 
assailed the hearing requirement for imposing inflexible standards on 
welfare administrators and foreclosing experimentation with other 
forms of procedural safeguards.92  For public benefits such as welfare, 
Judge Friendly argued that the Court too quickly adopted an adver-
sarial hearing model rather than allowing welfare administrators to 
experiment with more investigative or inquisitorial approaches to 
adjudication.93 
Other scholars exposed the limits of the fair hearing right.  Argu-
ing that merely making fair hearings available does not guarantee that 
erroneous deprivations of property rights will be overturned, Joel 
Handler identified the many conditions that must be satisfied before a 
welfare recipient can successfully challenge an erroneous decision at a 
 
89 See Kennedy, supra note 86, at 287 (arguing that fair hearing rights are significant 
because, inter alia, they “improve the accuracy of agency determinations”); David A. 
Super, Are Rights Efficient?  Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1065 (2005) (“[O]ne advantage of the adversarial system may be 
its accuracy . . . .”). 
90 Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 
1314 (1986). 
91 See generally Forbath, supra note 66, at 1856 (“The right to a hearing has not been 
treated kindly by critical legal scholars looking back on Goldberg v. Kelly and the welfare 
rights movement.”). 
92 See Friendly, supra note 42, at 1269 (criticizing “the tendency to judicialize 
administrative procedures”). 
93 See id. at 1316 (“There is need for experimentation, particularly for the use of the 
investigative model, for empirical studies, and for avoiding absolutes.”). 
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fair hearing.  According to Handler, the recipient must know that a 
wrong has been committed, know that there is a remedy, have the re-
sources to pursue the remedy, and calculate that the benefits of victory 
will outweigh the costs of trying.94  If any one of these conditions is not 
met, the right to a fair hearing is useless and the erroneous depriva-
tion will stand.95 
Scholars also criticized the Court’s reliance on fair hearings as the 
exclusive means for welfare recipients to exercise their due process 
rights.  As Lucie White explained, even when recipients request a fair 
hearing, feelings of intimidation and fear of retaliation can prevent 
recipients from speaking freely and participating fully in the hearing 
process—especially when they lack economic security and independ-
ence.96  Relatedly, White questioned whether the right to a fair hear-
ing actually compelled the government to treat welfare recipients 
with dignity97 or addressed recipients’ feelings of subordination or 
oppression.98 
 
94 HANDLER, supra note 70, at 22; see also id. at 22-34 (noting internal and 
external barriers that may prevent an average person from successfully asserting a 
due process claim).  
95 See id. at 22.  According to Handler, “It seems self-evident that the poor, 
minorities, the poorly educated, the newcomer, the frightened, the mentally ill, the 
sick, and other disadvantaged are not only more likely to suffer distress and injustice 
than those better off, but are also less likely to negotiate the antecedents of disputes.”  
Id. at 24 (internal citation omitted). 
96 See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:  Notes 
on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 54 (1990).  As White notes: 
In order to feel safe to speak out at a hearing, . . . [the recipient] needs 
more than post hoc remedies against overt acts of retaliation.  She also needs to 
feel economically secure, economically independent. . . . The social policies 
that might create such conditions are vigorously contested, and the political 
will that might enact them is not apparent.  Without such economic security, 
however, post hoc measures to deter retaliation will never fully dismantle the 
barrier that intimidation imposes to her speech. 
Id.; see also id. at 52 (“[R]emoving formal barriers to participation is not enough in our 
stratified society to achieve procedural justice, even in the modest sense of enabling all 
persons to participate in the rituals of their self-government on an equal basis.”).  
97 See Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 887 (1990) (“Constitutionalizing welfare procedures has not done 
very much to imbue the welfare system with the norms of human dignity that the Kelly 
decision rhetorically endorsed.”).  
98 See id. at 872 (arguing that lawyer-engineered remedies like Goldberg “still do not 
challenge the lived experience of subordination—the experience, that is, of other 
people controlling the terms of one’s life”); see also William H. Simon, The Rule of Law 
and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 787 (1990) 
(claiming that, with respect to the dignity of welfare beneficiaries, the Goldberg 
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Looking beyond the hearing room, scholars disputed the extent to 
which the right to a fair hearing could prevent erroneous deprivations 
of benefits from happening in the first place.  Fair hearings do not 
address barriers that prevent eligible individuals from applying for wel-
fare in the first instance.99  But scholars also contended that even after 
an individual submits an application, fair hearings provide “a very un-
systematic check on the quality of initial adjudications of claims,”100 
and do not sufficiently deter improper or illegal welfare policies.101  
And, of course, “fair hearings are virtually useless where a claimant was 
denied in technical compliance with the agency’s own rules.”102 
Somewhat counterintuitively, the fair hearing right was also at-
tacked for harming welfare recipients.  After Goldberg, some welfare 
administrators attempted to streamline fair hearing procedures in ways 
that resulted in less, not more, procedural protection for recipients.103  
 
approach “is unresponsive to the sense of oppression and degradation that the 
bureaucratized system engenders, as well as to the often gratuitous practical burdens of 
bureaucratic paper pushing and hoop jumping that the system imposes”). 
99 See Simon, supra note 98, at 786 (“[S]ome eligible beneficiaries do not even 
make it into the administrative sphere because they lack the information or resources 
needed to file an application.”); White, supra note 97, at 868-69 (“[T]he [Goldberg v.] 
Kelly remedy does not even reach the front end of the [welfare application] process, 
where a variety of tactics are used to screen out income-eligible applicants on 
procedural grounds, and to discourage others from seeking welfare at all.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  
100 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process:  Some Theoretical and 
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of 
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 787 (1974). 
101 See id. at 776-91 (arguing that fair hearings are unable to ensure accurate, fair, 
and timely adjudications of welfare benefit claims); Super, supra note 89, at 1086 
(“Over time, the fair-hearing system has shown significant limitations in policing 
eligibility workers’ behavior.”); White, supra note 97, at 868 (arguing that fair hearings 
are a “weak deterrent against illegal welfare policies” and that “[a] trickle of fair 
hearings will not deter a welfare agency from systematically misreading the law, 
particularly when the error will reduce welfare costs”).  According to William Simon, in 
places with high appeal rates like New York City, the fair hearing system “seems to have 
the perverse effect of reducing pressure for general administrative reform . . . . Rather 
than correcting errors or trying to get their superiors to do so, the workers tell the 
beneficiaries to take their claims to hearing.”   Simon, supra note 98, at 787.  
102 David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand:  The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for 
Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 835 n.57 (2004).  For example, fair hearings 
are of little value to a recipient “if a broken-down city bus prevents [her] from arriving at 
an interview and the program’s rules make no provision for rescheduling” or “[i]f [she] 
misunderstood the eligibility worker or an agency form and missed a deadline.”  Id.  
103 See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 176 (observing that post-Goldberg “[f]air 
hearings were routinized and sped up, making it more difficult for recipients to 
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William Simon and Jerry Mashaw argued that the Supreme Court’s 
focus on fair hearings prompted systemic changes in welfare admin-
istration that ultimately threatened the interests of recipients,104 while 
others claimed that Goldberg’s right to a fair hearing has masked injus-
tices that plague the administration of welfare benefits.105 
Lastly, the welfare recipients’ victory in Goldberg did not have the ef-
fect sought by members of the welfare rights movement.  In one sense, 
the right to a fair hearing came too late—by the early 1970s, the fair 
hearing campaigns of the 1960s had mostly run their course and the 
welfare rights movement was in retreat.106  Indeed, Goldberg was soon 
 
challenge the bureaucracy by asserting their rights to appeal” (citing BAUM, supra note 
68, at 39-40)).   
104 Mashaw described the post-Goldberg situation—in particular, the collision of 
rapidly increasing welfare rolls and states’ unwillingness to provide more funding for 
hearings or benefits—as follows: 
A strategy was needed that would preserve fiscal integrity and produce defensi-
ble decisions.  
A number of tactical moves ultimately comprised the grand design.  One 
was to tighten up and slow down the initial eligibility determination process.  
Another was to generalize and objectify the substantive eligibility criteria so 
that messy subjective judgments about individual cases would not have to be 
made and defended.  This move led to the realization that professional social 
welfare workers were no longer needed.  Costs could be reduced further by 
lowering the quality of the staff and by depersonalizing staff-claimant encoun-
ters.  If these reactions were not sufficient to restore fiscal balance, then pay-
ment levels could be reduced or allowed to remain stable in the face of rising 
prices. . . . Moreover, because hearings presumably protected the claimants’ 
interests, internal audit procedures were skewed to ignore nonpayment and 
underpayment problems and concentrate on preventing over-payments and 
payments to ineligibles.  
MASHAW, supra note 42, at 34. 
According to Simon, the “administrative changes that accompanied the emergence 
of the hearing system severely threaten beneficiary interests.  At worst, they encourage 
denials of benefits to eligible beneficiaries. . . . More generally, the tendency of 
administrative change has been to reduce the availability of administrative advice and 
assistance to claimants at the same time as to increase claimants’ need for them by 
making the process of establishing and maintaining eligibility more complex.”  Simon, 
supra note 98, at 786; see also William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the 
Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-19 (1983) (describing the shift toward a more 
formalistic administration of welfare programs). 
105 See Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 708-09 (1980) (reviewing 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)) (claiming that 
Goldberg deflected advocates “into a fruitless struggle against a bureaucracy that readily 
swallowed the Court-prescribed dose of due process without any change in symptoms, 
and . . . bolster[ed] the idea that fairness was not far away in the American welfare state”). 
106 See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 176 (“From the perspective of welfare rights 
activists, Justice Brennan’s affirmation of the right to a pre-termination fair hearing 
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derided for gaining little of substance for welfare recipients and, even 
worse, diverting energy from the movement.107 
Turning briefly to Mathews, scholars from across the political spec-
trum questioned the Court’s adoption of a utilitarian balancing ap-
proach to determine how much process is due in a particular situation.  
Conservative scholars argued that it was inappropriate for judges to 
determine what process is due.108  Under the positivist view of proce-
dural due process, for example, Judge Easterbrook claimed that the 
procedures required by the Due Process Clause must be limited to 
those procedures specified by existing state and federal laws.109  Simi-
larly, Richard Epstein argued that court-ordered fair hearings and 
 
came too late to do the work that they had planned for it.  Although the hearings were 
a longstanding demand, [Goldberg] was overwhelmed by defeats that came at virtually 
the same moment.”).  The welfare rights movement depended on society’s responding 
liberally to pressure on welfare agencies.  See Richard A. Cloward & Frances Fox Piven, 
The Weight of the Poor:  A Strategy to End Poverty, NATION, May 2, 1966, at 510, 510 
(describing a welfare rights strategy that involved, inter alia, using fair hearings to 
overwhelm the welfare system and prompt antipoverty legislation).  However realistic 
that might have been in the mid- or late-1960s, the election and reelection of President 
Nixon showed that such a response was unlikely.  Indeed, by the time Nixon’s Family 
Assistance Plan was defeated in 1971, it was clear that any changes to the existing 
welfare system would be to make welfare less, not more, generous.  See generally 
KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 148-60 (discussing the Nixon Administration’s shift 
toward a more conservative welfare policy). 
107 See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 66, at 1856 (arguing that the right to a fair hearing 
has become “a quintessential lawyer’s process-based reform, easily routinized within the 
welfare bureaucracy, its pursuit sapping movement energy and gaining nothing of 
substance”). 
108 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 
109-19 (discussing different approaches to determining what process is due).  
109 See id. at 125 (“Giving judges this power of revision may be wise or not. The 
Court may design its procedures well or poorly.  But there is no sound argument that 
this is a legitimate power or function of the Court.”).  This argument has been referred 
to as the “bitter with the sweet” approach to procedural due process.  Id. at 86.  It first 
arose in the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy. See 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) 
(“[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the 
limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a 
litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.”).  However, this 
approach was specifically rejected by six Justices.  See id. at 166-67 (Powell, J., joined by 
Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 177-78, 185 (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ., 
dissenting).  The Court ultimately rejected the approach in Cleveland Board of Education 
v. Loudermill.  470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. 
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 
455, 457-68 (1986) (challenging the positivist view of procedural due process). 
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other such procedures resulted from a misguided effort to micro-
manage administrative agencies.110   
At the same time, more liberal scholars assailed the instrumentalist 
tendencies of the Mathews cost-benefit approach to procedural due 
process.  They argued that Mathews placed too much emphasis on effi-
ciency,111 disregarding “process values,”112 and focusing on “subsidiary 
issues rather than the essence of the due process guarantee.”113  They 
also charged the Mathews approach with being impractical114 and easy 
to manipulate.115 
D.  Doctrinal Stability, Procedural Ossification, and Critical Silence 
The flurry of activity following Goldberg and Mathews did not last for 
long.  Once local, state, and federal agencies brought their administra-
tive procedures in line with the Court’s new interpretation of proce-
dural due process, there was little more to be done.  Aside from minor 
alterations in response to lawsuits targeting procedural flaws in partic-
 
110 See Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 770-75 (1990) 
(“Surely it is not possible to say here that the political process has failed utterly, even 
from Justice Brennan’s perspective, given the level of procedural protection that it did 
generate.  Why then ask the courts to micromanage the difference?”). 
111 See, e.g., Redish & Marshall, supra note 109, at 473 (“An efficiency-oriented 
balancing test, therefore, weighs an inevitable and immediately recognizable 
administrative cost against a largely prophylactic interest in the use of specific 
procedural protections.”). 
112 E.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative 
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:  Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976) (“The Eldridge Court conceives of the values of procedure 
too narrowly:  it views the sole purpose of procedural protections as ensuring 
accuracy, and thus limits its calculus to the benefits or costs that flow from incorrect 
decisions.  No attention is paid to ‘process values’ . . . .”); see also supra note 87 and 
accompanying text. 
113 Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 
1138 (1984).  
114 See id. at 1136-44; see also id. at 1138 (“This reliance upon ‘weight,’ which is a 
useful approach for dealing with bananas, leaves something to be desired where factors 
such as those in Mathews are concerned.”); Mashaw, supra note 112, at 48 (criticizing 
the Mathews approach for “ask[ing] unanswerable questions”). 
115 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674 (2d ed. 1988) 
(arguing that the Mathews balancing approach to procedural due process “not only 
overlooks the unquantifiable human interest in receiving decent treatment, but also 
provides the Court a facile means to justify the most cursory procedures by altering the 
relative weights to be accorded each of the three factors” (footnotes omitted)). 
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ular situations116 and some experimentation with additional procedural 
safeguards,117 the fair hearing procedures available today look virtually 
identical to those established in the wake of Goldberg and Mathews.118 
The attention paid by scholars to procedural due process followed 
a similar arc.  After a rich debate over the Supreme Court’s approach 
to procedural due process in Goldberg and Mathews during the 1970s and 
1980s, most scholars shifted their focus to other areas of law.  Although 
the 1996 federal welfare law caused a spike in scholarly attention to 
procedural due process,119 that interest quickly subsided.  By 1998, 
 
116 Challenges to welfare fair hearing procedures began immediately following 
Goldberg.  See, e.g., Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1078 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(challenging fair hearing procedures adopted by New York City after Goldberg and 
stating that “this case begins where Goldberg v. Kelly ends” (citations omitted)).  Some 
post-Goldberg lawsuits involved due process challenges to rules granting eligibility 
workers virtually unlimited and unreviewable discretion.  See, e.g., Carey v. Quern, 588 
F.2d 230, 231 (7th Cir. 1978) (challenging rule concerning recipients’ entitlement to a 
clothing allowance); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 751 (7th Cir. 1976) (challenging 
termination of general assistance grants based on administrator’s own unwritten 
personal standards).  Others challenged the adequacy of notices used to reduce or 
discontinue various types of public benefits.  See, e.g., Cosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967, 969 
(7th Cir. 1988) (unemployment insurance); Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889, 890 (3d Cir. 
1986) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)); Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 
250, 252 (3d Cir. 1984) (WIC); Dilda v. Quern, 612 F.2d 1055, 1055 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(per curiam) (AFDC); Eder v. Beal, 609 F.2d 695, 696 (3d Cir. 1979) (Medicaid); Banks 
v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 838 (7th Cir. 1975) (food stamps); Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 
485, 486 (7th Cir. 1974) (Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled). 
117 See infra Section III.B. 
118 See Telephone Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, Dir. of Litig., N.Y. Legal 
Assistance Grp. (Mar. 26, 2012) (discussing her experiences representing individuals at 
fair hearings held during the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s). 
119 Scholars offered some initial thoughts on the status of welfare recipients’ due 
process rights after the enactment of the 1996 federal welfare law.  See, e.g., Christine N. 
Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 89, 
125-32 (2002) (discussing the status of welfare recipients’ procedural due process rights 
after 1996); Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing “Revolution” and “Reform”:  Procedural Due 
Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591, 618-23 (1998) (arguing that the 
1996 law’s anti-entitlement provision, 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2006), is directed at recipients’ 
ability, accepted by the Supreme Court in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), to enforce 
statutory terms and conditions against state programs, rather than individual 
recipients’ due process rights); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process:  
Countering the Due Process Counterrevoution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 36 (1997) (suggesting 
that, after 1996, “welfare beneficiaries may no longer be constitutionally entitled to pre-
termination hearings, or to any other due process protections”); see also infra notes 129-
31 and accompanying text.   
Later, scholars examined the effect of welfare privatization on recipients’ due 
process rights.  See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1307-10 (2003) (discussing impact of welfare privatization on 
due process rights); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized 
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Cynthia Farina accurately referred to this silence as “a long dry spell” 
in the debate over procedural due process.120  
In the meantime, Goldberg’s right to a fair hearing remains good law 
and welfare agencies continue to act accordingly.  Indeed, despite the 
radical changes wrought by the 1996 federal welfare law, as well as new 
facts and circumstances that have come with the passage of time, wel-
fare recipients’ procedural due process rights are the same today as 
they were over forty years ago. 
II.  POST-GOLDBERG CHANGES TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF WELFARE PROGRAMS AND WELFARE RECIPIENTS 
When the Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly that welfare re-
cipients have a due process right to a fair hearing before their benefits 
are terminated, the Court chose the required procedural safeguards 
based on its careful consideration of the facts and circumstances as 
they existed in 1970.121  The Court reaffirmed this fact-intensive ap-
proach to procedural due process six years later in Mathews v. Eldridge, 
when it adopted the three-factor balancing framework for evaluating 
due process claims that remains in use today.122  During the decades 
since Goldberg and Mathews, welfare programs have changed in a variety 
of ways that affect the facts as the Goldberg Court understood them and 
that bear upon one or more of the Mathews factors. 
The most obvious and consequential change to welfare since Gold-
berg occurred when President Clinton signed into law the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA).123  PRWORA abolished the open-ended, federal matching 
funding structure of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
 
Welfare, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 603-23 (2001) (discussing the enforcement of due 
process rights in a privatized welfare system); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1383-88 (2003) (describing the expansion of 
welfare privatization and how such systems may undermine constitutional 
accountability).  See generally Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:  Accounting 
for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1259 (2003) (describing privitization’s 
struggle with maintaining accountability). 
120 Farina, supra note 119, at 591. 
121 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-71 (1970). 
122 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-49 (1976). 
123 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended primarily in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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(AFDC) program124 and replaced it with the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program’s fixed block grants.125  Among its 
most consequential programmatic changes, PRWORA shifted signifi-
cant policymaking authority from the federal government to the 
states,126 instituted a five-year limit on an individual’s receipt of federal 
cash benefits,127 and imposed work requirements on recipients of wel-
fare benefits.128  
PRWORA’s enactment cast doubt on the procedural due process 
rights that had been afforded to welfare recipients since Goldberg.  The 
statute declared an end to any statutory entitlement to federal assis-
tance,129 sparking debate over whether welfare benefits still qualified as 
property interests subject to due process protection.  Numerous schol-
ars made the case for why recipients retained the right to a fair hear-
ing established by Goldberg,130 while others sought to expose the 
harmful consequences of weakened due process protections.131   
 
124 The first incarnation of AFDC, Aid to Dependent Children, was created by the 
Social Security Act of 1935.  Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 401–406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-629  
(repealed 1996).  The law was amended and renamed Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children in 1962.  Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(1)–
(5), 76 Stat. 172, 185 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
125 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619 (2006). 
126 See id. § 604(a)(1) (providing that states can use the TANF block grant “in any 
manner that is reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose of this part”); see also 
Diller, supra note 61, at 1147 (“PRWORA largely permits states to design their own 
programs . . . .”); Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare:  How the Dominant Narratives of 
Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 
593 (2004) (stating that in passing PRWORA, Congress “relinquished unprecedented 
programmatic responsibility over welfare to the states”). 
127 See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A) (“A State . . . shall not use any part of the grant to 
provide assistance . . . for 60 months (whether or not consecutive) after the date the 
State program funded under this part commences . . . .”). 
128 See id. § 607(a)(1) (establishing minimum work participation rates).  
129 See id. § 601(b) (“This part [§§ 601–619] shall not be interpreted to entitle any 
individual or family to assistance under any State program funded under this part.”).  
Despite this anti-entitlement language, the statute also included a vague requirement 
that states provide a process that sounds like a fair hearing.  See id. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iii) 
(requiring states to “provide opportunities for recipients who have been adversely affected 
to be heard in a State administrative or appeal process”). 
130 See, e.g., Cimini, supra note 119, at 125-32; Farina, supra note 119, at 618-23; 
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don’t Add Up To Rights:  The Importance of Preserving Due 
Process In Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1111, 1139-49 (1996) 
(identifying approaches to preserving due process rights after welfare reform). 
131 See, e.g., Randal S. Jeffrey, The Importance of Due Process Protections After Welfare 
Reform:  Client Stories from New York City, 66 ALB. L. REV. 123, 125-27 (2002) 
(documenting the impact of weakened due process protections on welfare recipients in 
New York City); cf. Susan T. Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal:  Differences in Caseworker 
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More than fifteen years after the passage of PRWORA, however, fears 
about the demise of the fair hearing right appear to have been overstat-
ed.  Very few welfare agencies have disputed recipients’ right to a fair 
hearing, and the only state court to consider whether such a right  
remains after PRWORA held that, under the laws of that state, recipients 
are still entitled to the due process protections mandated by Goldberg.132 
Although welfare recipients’ right to a fair hearing has survived the 
major changes to welfare in the mid-1990s,133 whether fair hearings 
provide recipients with meaningful procedural safeguards against er-
roneous deprivations is far from clear.  Many aspects of welfare and 
the circumstances of welfare recipients have changed since the Court 
decided Goldberg in 1970, and some of these changes bear upon one or 
more of the Mathews factors.   
As this Part will show, these changes can be organized into three 
categories.  First, welfare administrators now contend with new and 
powerful incentives to shrink the welfare rolls.  Second, the circum-
stances in which welfare recipients find themselves have changed in 
ways that undermine recipients’ ability to exercise their right to a fair 
hearing in a meaningful way.  For example, recipients who are able to 
hold jobs often must choose between exercising their right to a fair 
hearing and keeping their job, and all recipients are much less likely 
to secure free legal representation at fair hearings.  Third, technologi-
cal advancements have streamlined aspects of welfare administration 
and created opportunities for additional procedural safeguards at little 
extra cost.  At the same time, welfare administrators’ increased reli-
ance on automation has exposed recipients to new risks of erroneous 
deprivations.  Finally, this Part distills the new procedural needs wel-
fare recipients face in light of some or all of these changes. 
A.  New Incentives to Terminate Welfare Benefits 
Welfare administrators today are subject to powerful incentives—
incentives that that did not exist in the 1970s—to reduce the welfare 
 
Support Towards Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 HARV. J. AFR. AM. PUB. POL’Y 23, 27-31 
(1997) (describing differences in discretionary treatment of white and black welfare 
recipients in Virginia). 
132 See Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469, 477 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[W]e conclude that 
because plaintiffs had a property right . . . in continued receipt of welfare benefits, 
plaintiffs were constitutionally entitled to procedural due process.”). 
133 See Lens, supra note 66, at 30 (stating that, even after the 1996 law “[a]ll 
states . . . provide some form of administrative hearings”). 
Parkin FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)  4/10/2012 5:59 PM 
2012] Adaptable Due Process 1339 
 
rolls.  The primary source for these new incentives is the 1996 federal 
welfare law, which restructured the welfare system in ways that rewarded 
states for reducing the number of individuals receiving welfare bene-
fits.134  At the same time, the legislation’s rollback of federal statutory 
and regulatory rules granted states more welfare policymaking author-
ity than they had enjoyed since the early 1960s,135 while undercutting 
preexisting means of holding administrators and caseworkers account-
able for their decisions.136  This new discretionary regime137 has created 
opportunities for the caseload-cutting incentives to affect the routine 
handling of welfare cases,138 placing more pressure on the fair hearing 
system to weed out erroneous terminations.139 
Incentives to cut people off welfare are not new.  Five years before 
the Supreme Court decided Goldberg, Edward Sparer argued that wel-
fare administrators are subject to strong incentives to reduce costs, and 
that those incentives are rarely balanced by pressure to achieve the 
substantive purposes of welfare programs.140  The federal government 
 
134 See infra subsection II.A.1. 
135 See Diller, supra note 61, at 1134-40, 1145-48 (identifying different paradigms of 
welfare administration). 
136 See id. at 1186-212 (arguing that the current welfare regime “has the potential to 
render existing mechanisms for establishing public accountability largely ineffective or 
irrelevant”); see also Super, supra note 102, at 869-80 (noting the challenges facing 
advocates trying to promote accountability). 
137 See Diller, supra note 61, at 1145-63 (describing the return to discretion 
following passage of the 1996 federal welfare law). 
138 See Michaels, supra note 126, at 598 (noting that states “may exploit their 
discretionary authority and under-provide services in ways that leave hundreds of 
thousands of individuals materially far worse off than even a fiscally conservative 
Congress might have intended”); cf. REBECCA GORDON, APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., 
CRUEL AND USUAL:  HOW WELFARE “REFORM” PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 18 (2001) 
(finding that the post-1996 welfare system was “overwhelmingly arbitrary” in 
determining eligibility for benefits); Gooden, supra note 131, at 23 (describing 
differences in the discretionary treatment of white and black welfare recipients). 
139 These new incentives have also greatly increased the risk that welfare agencies 
will turn away eligible applicants in order to limit their welfare caseloads.  See Diller, 
supra note 61, at 1152 (discussing states’ adoption of “‘diversion’ policies—that seek to 
dissuade potentially eligible individuals from applying for benefits.”).  These types of 
front-end decisions are very difficult to challenge at a fair hearing.  Id. at 1201 (“Diver-
sion activities are generally beyond the reach of the hearing process as individuals who 
are diverted are not formally denied benefits and thus have no determinations from 
which to appeal.”); see also supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
140 See Edward V. Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client’s Lawyer, 12 UCLA L. REV. 361, 
375 (1965) (explaining that “[v]irtually no pressure . . . is ordinarily exerted on behalf 
of the welfare client,” while welfare administrators must contend with “many inhibiting 
factors”). 
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contributed to this imbalance in the 1970s when it adopted a “quality 
control”141 regime for AFDC that punished states for overpayments and 
payments to ineligible recipients, but not for underpayments or exclu-
sions of eligible beneficiaries.142  Despite the existence of the fair hear-
ing right, fair hearings did not exert a “counterbalancing influence.”143  
Thus, even before 1996, welfare administrators and caseworkers were 
pressured to deny, reduce, or terminate benefits with little fear of re-
percussion.   
Yet the incentives at work prior to 1996 pale in comparison to those 
created by PRWORA.  Since its passage, welfare administrators have 
faced new and powerful financial incentives to reduce the number of 
individuals receiving welfare benefits.  At the same time, states and 
localities have been given the freedom to contract out the administra-
tion of welfare programs, which has introduced additional incentives 
to reduce welfare caseloads.  These new incentives, together with in-
creased ground-level discretion and a political atmosphere that is 
deeply hostile to welfare programs,144 have revolutionized the admin-
istration of welfare benefits in ways that have greatly increased the risk 
of erroneous deprivations. 
 
141 In the context of public benefit programs, quality control or quality assurance 
systems “typically take the form of specialized audits in which an independent unit 
examines a subset of cases in which benefits were granted to check for errors.”  Super, 
supra note 89, at 1098-99. 
142 See EVELYN Z. BRODKIN, THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:  
IMPLEMENTING QUALITY CONTROL IN WELFARE 9-11, 94-100 (1986) (discussing 
incentives created by AFDC’s quality control mechanisms); Timothy J. Casey & Mary R. 
Mannix, Quality Control in Public Assistance:  Victimizing the Poor Through One-Sided 
Accountability, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1381, 1385 (1989) (explaining that the welfare 
quality control system caused denials of eligible families to skyrocket); Anna Lou 
Dehavenon, Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka:  The Maladministration of New York City’s 
Public Assistance Programs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 231, 245-47 (1990) 
(linking quality control systems with the phenomenon of overdenial of benefits); cf. 
Super, supra note 89, at 1109-10 (detailing the perverse incentives created by the food 
stamp program’s quality control system).  These types of quality control mechanisms 
have been called “counter-entitlements.”  See id. at 1073 (“Even before PRWORA, the 
counter-entitlement balancing the entitlement to [AFDC] was far stronger than the 
entitlement, influencing agencies’ behavior far more powerfully.”).  
143 Diller, supra note 61, at 1142.  Indeed, even when eligibility workers’ decisions to 
deny, reduce, or terminate benefits were overturned at a fair hearing, the “workers 
were not held accountable.”  Id. 
144 See id. at 1183 (“Political leaders now compete for the largest declines in welfare 
enrollment.  Where enrollment has not plummeted as quickly as elsewhere, welfare 
reform is deemed a failure.  In fact, TANF caseload reduction is the most common 
performance measure used by local agencies.”(footnote omitted)). 
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1.  Changes in Welfare Funding Create New Incentives 
to Terminate Welfare Benefits 
PRWORA redesigned the way the federal government funds the 
provision of welfare benefits.  Prior to 1996, the AFDC program re-
quired the federal government to provide matching funds equal to a 
portion of a state’s expenditures on welfare.145  Since then, however, 
the federal government has provided annual block grants in a fixed 
amount.146  Under this system, states receive the same amount of fed-
eral funding whether their welfare caseloads increase, decrease, or stay 
the same.  And if a state does not exhaust its block grant funds in a 
particular year, it is not required to return all of the unspent money to 
the federal government.147  
The post-1996 block-grant–funding mechanism creates powerful 
new financial incentives for the states.  By reducing the number of in-
dividuals receiving welfare benefits, states can reallocate federal wel-
fare funds to support more popular programs, even programs 
unrelated to the provision of social welfare services.148  In other words, 
paying welfare benefits to the poor now competes with the rest of a 
state’s budgetary priorities.149  For example, in 1998, Wisconsin spent 
$98 million less on welfare than it received in its block grant for that 
year.150  Rather than returning the money to the federal government, 
 
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (Supp. II 1996) (establishing the method of computing 
federal payments to states). 
146 A state’s block grant amount is based on the amount it received from the AFDC 
program in the mid-1990s, with states exercising some choice over three alternative base 
periods.  See id. § 603(a)(1) (2006) (describing how a state’s block grant is calculated). 
147 Id. § 604(d)–(e). 
148 See Super, supra note 89, at 1131 (“[The] simultaneous conversion of states’ 
former AFDC funding into a fixed block grant gave states a further fiscal incentive to 
reduce participation since they could use any resulting savings in other programs.”); see 
also Michaels, supra note 126, at 613 (“[States] may use their legally granted discretion 
to free up federal dollars ostensibly earmarked for welfare provisions to support more 
popular projects.”).  This process has been referred to as “supplantation” and has been 
subject to criticism by Congress.  See Letter from Rep. Nancy L. Johnson, Chairman, 
U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on Ways & Means, to U.S. Governors (Mar. 15, 
2000), available at http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/johnson00.htm (urging states to stop 
supplantation and warning that “if the savings from supplanted federal funds are used 
for purposes other than those specified in the TANF legislation, Congress will react by 
assuming that we have provided states with too much money”).  
149 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-828, WELFARE REFORM:  
CHALLENGES IN MAINTAINING A FEDERAL-STATE FISCAL PARTNERSHIP 6 (2001) 
(finding that states have “replaced, rather than supplemented, their own spending with 
federal TANF dollars thereby freeing up state funds for other budget priorities”). 
150 Michaels, supra note 126, at 617. 
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spending the savings on welfare programs, or strengthening the social 
safety net in some other way, it used the unspent TANF money to fund 
education, tax relief, and other programs.151  Other states have saved 
their unspent federal block grant funds for a “rainy day.”152  Thus, the 
more states can shrink their welfare caseloads, the more TANF block 
grant money they can use for other spending priorities. 
This type of incentive has worked its way down to the county level.  
In Ohio, where each county negotiates its own plan for welfare admin-
istration with the state, the state offers financial rewards to counties 
that reduce the number of people receiving welfare benefits:  counties 
that reduce their caseloads receive financial bonuses, and counties 
“that spend less than their allocated amounts can retain fifty percent 
of the difference.”153  Similarly, in California, the state passes along its 
TANF funding in the form of block grants to the counties, and coun-
ties are permitted to retain one-hundred percent of any savings that 
occurs when recipients leave the welfare rolls.154  Thus, for cash-
strapped counties in these states, welfare programs have become a 
tempting source of additional funds. 
2.  Federal Work Requirements Create New Incentives to  
Terminate Welfare Benefits 
PRWORA’s requirement that welfare recipients work in exchange 
for their benefits creates powerful incentives for states and localities 
administering welfare programs—but perhaps not the incentives one 
might expect.  By establishing financial penalties155 for states that do 
 
151 Id. at 617.  Other states have also used unspent TANF block grant funds to 
support programs unrelated to the social safety net.  See, e.g., Joshua Green, The Welfare 
Shell Game (describing Texas’s intent to substitute federal funds for state funds and thus 
“launder[] federal welfare dollars to finance more politically popular programs”), in 
MAKING WORK PAY:  AMERICA AFTER WELFARE 46, 46 (Robert Kuttner ed., 2002); 
Sewell Chan, D.C. Welfare Funds to Go to Children; Critics Say $12 Million Shift Irresponsible, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2000, at B1 (describing reallocation of TANF funds away from 
helping “move welfare recipients into the workforce” and toward youth initiatives); Jim 
McLean & Chris Grenz, Use of Welfare Grant Debated, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J., Aug. 30, 2000, 
at 7, available at 2000 WLNR 4302386 (describing Kansas’s redirection of nearly half its 
TANF money to foster care programs). 
152 Michaels, supra note 126, at 617. 
153 Diller, supra note 61, at 1179-80. 
154 Id. at 1180. 
155 See 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(3) (2006) (establishing penalties of up to twenty-one 
percent of a state’s TANF grant for states that fail to comply with the work 
participation rate). 
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not meet statewide work participation rates,156 the law obviously incen-
tivizes states to demand that welfare recipients engage in some form of 
work.  However, there is an even stronger set of incentives built into 
PRWORA’s structure.  A state can avoid being penalized for failing to 
satisfy its work participation requirement by reducing the size of its 
welfare caseload.  For each percentage point that a state’s average 
monthly caseload declines in comparison to a benchmark level set by 
statute, the state is granted a “caseload reduction credit” that reduces 
the state’s work participation requirement by one percentage point.157  
Under this system, states that have aggressively cut their welfare case-
loads since 1996 are rewarded with relaxed work participation  
requirements. 
The availability of caseload reduction credits has created a strong 
incentive for states to push recipients off the welfare rolls.158  Establish-
ing workfare programs and helping recipients transition from welfare 
to work can be expensive,159 while finding ways to close cases and reap 
caseload reduction credits is cheap and reduces costs in the long run.  
It is therefore not surprising that states have used caseload reduction 
credits to shield themselves from the full impact of PRWORA’s work 
participation requirements.  Indeed, from 2000 to 2005, caseload re-
duction credits rendered the federal statewide work requirements al-
most meaningless:   despite a statutory minimum work participation rate 
of fifty percent, caseload reduction credits resulted in an adjusted rate 
 
156 Mandatory statewide work participation rates started at twenty-five percent of 
welfare recipients in 1997 and peaked at fifty percent in 2002, where the rate remains 
today.  Id. § 607(a)(1).  
157 See id. § 607(b)(3)(A)(ii) (setting the benchmark at the state’s 2005 caseload).  
The caseload reduction credit benchmark was initially set at a state’s 1995 welfare 
caseload.  42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 2005).  But the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005 changed the benchmark to a state’s 2005 caseload.  Pub. L. No. 109-171, 
§ 7102(a)(1)(B), 120 Stat. 4, 136 (2006). 
158 See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:  
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 617-18 (1999) 
(“[T]he structure of the Act creates a strong incentive for state political actors to focus 
exclusively on achieving caseload reductions, regardless of the means or consequences, 
or to approach welfare reform merely as a means for achieving fiscal savings.”); Diller, 
supra note 61, at 1179 (explaining that PRWORA’s creation of caseload reduction 
credits “places a premium on achieving caseload reduction through means that make it 
more difficult for ‘eligible’ individuals to obtain benefits initially and to maintain 
eligibility once on the rolls”); cf. Super, supra note 102, at 848 (“[T]he TANF statute 
gives a strong preference to caseload reductions through informal means.”). 
159 See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 84, 117 (1995). 
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of zero percent for thirty-one states, with the remaining nineteen states 
facing requirements between one percent and twenty-eight percent.160 
3.  Opportunities for Privatization Create New Incentives  
to Terminate Welfare Benefits 
The 1996 welfare law introduced an additional set of incentives to 
terminate benefits when it removed statutory limitations on the ability 
of states and localities to privatize the administration of welfare pro-
grams.161  For the first time, private corporations were permitted to take 
over all aspects of welfare administration, including individual eligibility 
determinations.162  The private entities that have since won contracts to 
administer welfare programs have brought new norms and motivations, 
resulting in additional pressure to reduce the welfare rolls.163 
The contracting out of welfare services to for-profit entities is a rel-
atively recent phenomenon.  It began with contracts to run work pro-
grams, which became more commonplace after the Family Support 
Act of 1988 expanded federal work requirements.164  Private entities 
were also enlisted to handle functions such as information manage-
ment and data processing.165  Prior to 1996, however, federal law  
 
160 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-770, WELFARE REFORM:  WITH TANF 
FLEXIBILITY, STATES VARY IN HOW THEY IMPLEMENT WORK REQUIREMENTS AND TIME 
LIMITS 11-12 tbl.2 (2002).  The work participation requirements returned to prominence 
in 2006, after the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 set a new benchmark for caseload 
reduction credits.  See supra note 157.  But states were later effectively excused from 
penalties for failing to satisfy the requirements by language contained in the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 2101(b), 123 Stat. 115, 
448-69 (2009) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. III 2009)). 
161 In this context, the terms “privatize” and “privatization” refer to contracting out 
the administration of all or part of TANF programs to private contractors that are 
typically reimbursed and evaluated pursuant to performance measures that emphasize 
outcomes.  See Diller, supra note 61, at 1181-82. 
162 See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1) (2006) (permitting states to “administer and provide 
services under the [TANF program] through contracts with charitable, religious, or 
private organizations” and to provide TANF beneficiaries with “certificates, vouchers, 
or other forms of disbursement which are redeemable with such organizations”). 
163 See Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power:  Reconfiguring 
Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 279 (2009) (“In 
the welfare-to-work area, privatization has been a major tool in a very effective 
campaign to significantly reduce the welfare rolls.”). 
164 Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 2343, 2357 (requiring “all recipients of 
aid to families with dependent children . . . with respect to whom the State guarantees 
child care . . . to participate in the [job opportunities and basic skills training] 
program”). 
165 Michaels, supra note 126, at 624-25. 
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expressly prohibited states from privatizing eligibility determinations 
and case management.166  Thus, corporations did not decide whether 
to grant or deny welfare benefits or the amount of benefits that should 
be issued.  In other words, government workers, not employees of private 
companies, were the only ones with authority to determine whether to 
deprive an individual of his or her constitutionally protected property 
interest. 
PRWORA repealed AFDC’s constraints on privatization, replacing 
them with TANF’s broad grant of permission to states and localities to 
contract out some or all of their welfare programs.167  Thus, since 1996, 
private corporations have been permitted to make eligibility determi-
nations that result in the deprivation of welfare recipients’ benefits.168  
This change in the law created an opportunity for both for-profit and 
not-for-profit corporations to win contracts to administer entire wel-
fare programs.169  
The privatization of welfare services has increased dramatically 
since the 1990s.170  Many states eagerly turned over much of their newly 
gained authority to private corporations,171 while the contracting oppor-
tunities created by the 1996 welfare law attracted for-profit corpora-
tions looking for new sources of revenue.172  Within five years of 
PRWORA’s passage, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia had 
contracted with private entities to provide at least some welfare ser-
 
166 Id. at 625-26. 
167 See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A); see also Bach, supra note 163, at 279 (“Today, the 
full range of services, from eligibility determinations to welfare-to-work services, are 
being conducted not directly by government entities but by private, often large, for-
profit corporate entities.”). 
168 See Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare:  Non-Accountability and Diminished 
Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1559, 1566 (2001) (“The Act now authorizes states to employ private entities to conduct 
intake and make eligibility determinations—traditional gate-keeping functions . . . most 
often identified with the legal [Goldberg] protections developed under AFDC.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  However, “[a]s a practical matter, [PRWORA’s] allowance of the 
contracting out of eligibility determinations was limited, to a certain extent, by the 
federal government’s refusal to allow the contracting out of eligibility determinations 
for food stamps and Medicaid.”  Bach, supra note 163, at 279 n.10. 
169 See Michaels, supra note 126, at 624 (observing that lifting the limits on 
privatization gave for-profit corporations “unparalleled and previously uncontemplated 
opportunities” to participate in the provision of welfare benefits). 
170 See Bach, supra note 163, at 278; see also Kennedy, supra note 86, at 256 (“All over 
the country, state governments are turning to private corporations to run their welfare 
systems.”). 
171 Kennedy, supra note 86, at 232.  
172 Bach, supra note 163, at 279-80.  
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vices.173  Of the $1.5 billion paid by states to private entities to operate 
TANF and TANF-related programs in 2001, for-profit entities collected 
approximately thirteen percent.174  
The rise of privatization has introduced new incentives to termi-
nate benefits and reduce welfare caseloads.  As a general matter, for-
profit private contractors are not merely motivated by profit; they have 
a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to maximize profits above all 
other considerations.175  In the context of welfare privatization, this 
profit motive can affect the way welfare programs are administered, 
with potentially harmful consequences for welfare recipients.176   
The incentives at work in welfare privatization are evident in the 
terms of payment included in contracts.  Many welfare privatization 
contracts are “performance-based,” meaning that payment on the con-
tract is conditioned, in whole or in part, on the private company’s sat-
isfaction of some specified outcome or outcomes.177  Different types of 
performance-based contracts create different incentives:  contracts 
that base payments on the number of individuals served by the vendor 
incentivize “churn[ing] or divert[ing]” recipients; contracts that base 
payments on flat fees incentivize simply pushing recipients off the 
rolls; and contracts that base payments on outcomes, such as the num-
ber of recipients placed in a job, incentivize devoting the most re-
sources to those already likely to get jobs while ignoring, under-
serving, or even closing the cases of individuals facing significant bar-
riers to employment.178 
 
173 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-245, WELFARE REFORM:  INTERIM 
REPORT ON POTENTIAL WAYS TO STRENGTHEN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF STATE AND 
LOCAL CONTRACTING 8 (2002). 
174 Id.  Among the various services provided by contractors to states in 2001, the 
most common were “employment and training services, job placement services, and 
support services to promote job entry or retention.”  Id. 
175 See Kennedy, supra note 86, at 302. 
176 See id. (arguing that “the private provider will seek to maximize profits even if it 
means harming the needy”).  The consequences go beyond unjustified terminations of 
benefits.  See David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 
393, 455-56 (2008) (arguing that contracting out the administration of public benefits 
programs is “likely to result in some significant policy paralysis”). 
177 Diller, supra note 61, at 1181-82. 
178 Michaels, supra note 126, at 631; see also Metzger, supra note 119, at 1387-88 
(“[U]nder a performance-based system providing financial rewards for the number of 
successful job placements, private contractors have a visible incentive to try to serve 
only the most employable beneficiaries, or to dissuade hard-to-employ individuals from 
continuing in programs by means of onerous participation requirements and 
sanctions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Although contracts for the provision of welfare services can be 
structured to incentivize the provision of high-quality services and to 
protect the rights of welfare recipients,179 such contracts appear to be 
the exception and not the rule.180  The privatization experience in 
Wisconsin is illustrative.  There, in its first round of privatization after 
the 1996 welfare law, the state made extensive use of private contrac-
tors as part of its welfare-to-work program.181  By permitting contractors 
to keep benefits they withheld from recipients as a result of case sanc-
tions, the contracts created enormous incentives to withhold benefits 
and services from recipients.182  And even when contracts are struc-
tured to minimize incentives to terminate benefits, the lack of a com-
petitive market for comparable administrative services may reduce 
contractors’ motivation to comply fully with their contracts.183 
 
179 For example, in the wake of welfare reform in Florida, the state established 
payment systems that incentivized service provision:  contractors were paid twenty 
percent of their payment when they placed an individual in a job, and the final ten 
percent if the individual kept the job for eight months.  Diller, supra note 61, at 1182.  
Some scholars have noted that privatization could improve services currently provided 
by government agencies.  See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 119; Metzger, supra note 119; 
Minow, supra note 119. 
180 See Michaels, supra note 126, at 632 (“[A] shocking number of contracts already 
have been subject to abuse of discretion by corporations that have managed to 
achieve . . . super-profitable ends—under the noses of government contracting 
agents.”); see also id. at 632-33 (discussing problems with welfare contracts in New York, 
California, Wisconsin, Connecticut, and Maryland). 
181 Karyn Rotker et al., Wisconsin Works—For Private Contractors, That Is, 35 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 530, 533 (2002). 
182 Id.; see also SHEENA MCCONNELL ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, 
INC., PRIVATIZATION IN PRACTICE:  CASE STUDIES OF CONTRACTING FOR TANF CASE 
MANAGEMENT 48 (2003) (observing that Wisconsin’s contracts created the “potential 
for serious unintended incentives”).  Medicare and Medicaid managed care contracts 
have been criticized for creating similar incentives.  See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 119, at 
1383 (acknowledging the “obvious hazards” and “strong financial incentives to deny 
coverage for medically needed but expensive treatments” that result from Medicare 
contractual provisions that give providers a share of savings from reducing recipients’ 
cost of care); Jennifer L. Wright, Unconstitutional or Impossible:  The Irreconcilable Gap 
Between Managed Care and Due Process in Medicaid and Medicare, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 135, 169-70 (2000) (arguing that Medicare and Medicaid managed care 
providers have financial incentives to refuse authorization where care exceeds a fixed 
rate of compensation per enrollee). 
183 See Super, supra note 176, at 418-21 (“[I]f an administrative services vendor is 
performing deficiently, the costs and disruption of selecting a new contractor and 
having that contractor build up the infrastructure required to operate the program 
may leave the state with no other alternative but to stay with its existing contractor.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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To be sure, government bureaucracies also face incentives to re-
duce welfare caseloads.184  Yet the incentives facing private companies 
are both stronger and more deeply rooted.  Jon Michaels has distin-
guished the two types of incentives this way:  “Corporations have a 
preexisting fiduciary commitment to shareholders that they are duty-
bound to prioritize over any commitment to government ser-
vice. . . . This core institutional characteristic far exceeds any discre-
tionary motivation among public bureaucrats to cut costs.”185  Thus, 
the pressures on state agencies to reduce their welfare caseloads do 
not compare to the incentives that influence private corporations.186  
In addition, to the extent that norms of public service can be said to 
characterize the actions of government agencies and their employees, 
such norms are absent in the profit-seeking atmosphere of private 
corporations.187  Accordingly, without contractual provisions that coun-
teract incentives to cut recipients off the rolls, the post-1996 rise in 
privatization increases the risk that welfare benefits are erroneously 
terminated. 
B.  New Circumstances Facing Welfare Recipients 
In Goldberg, the Supreme Court emphasized that due process re-
quired that the “opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the ca-
pacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”188  Since 
then, the circumstances facing welfare recipients have changed in 
countless ways, some of which bear directly on recipients’ ability to 
 
184 See supra subsections II.A.1-2. 
185 Michaels, supra note 126, at 629 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 628 
(explaining that corporations have a “fiduciary duty to promote shareholder wealth, 
which goes well beyond a state or city’s incentive to under-provide services”); id. at 629 
(“No company can be expected to protect the interests of the needy at the expense of 
its bottom line, least of all a publicly traded company with a fiduciary duty to maximize 
shareholder profits.” (quoting Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering Race to Run 
State Welfare Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at A1)). 
186 See Michaels, supra note 126, at 631-32 (“The incentive for state welfare agencies 
to [underprovide services] . . . does not rise to the level we would customarily associate 
with rent-seeking private corporations.”). But cf. Minow, supra note 119, at 1258 
(arguing that public failures support experimentation with privatization). 
187 See Bezdek, supra note 168, at 1606 (outlining the concern that “private vendors 
may lack the norms of public service and of professionalism, which characterize many 
public bureaucracies”). 
188 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) (citing J.M. Wedemeyer & Percy 
Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 326, 342 (1966)); see also supra 
Section I.A. 
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utilize the fair hearing process to defend against erroneous depriva-
tions.  Two changes in particular have rendered the fair hearing right 
almost meaningless in many situations:  the higher proportion of wel-
fare recipients who are holding a job while collecting benefits, and the 
lower proportion of recipients who are able to secure free legal repre-
sentation at a fair hearing.  
1.  Work Requirements Undermine the Right to a Fair Hearing 
One of the most visible differences in the circumstances of welfare 
recipients since the 1970s is the higher proportion of recipients who 
are employed in the low-wage workforce.  Collecting benefits while 
holding a job presents new obstacles to welfare recipients seeking to 
exercise their right to a fair hearing.  Although some welfare recipi-
ents held jobs prior to Goldberg, and those recipients faced similar 
problems,189 the proportion of recipients in such a situation has in-
creased considerably since 1970.190 
Of all the substantive and symbolic changes to welfare caused by 
the 1996 welfare law, perhaps most significant was its focus on work 
requirements.  The idea that recipients should work in exchange for 
their benefits was not unprecedented before 1996; indeed, the federal 
government formally established work requirements in the 1960s,191 
 
189 See, e.g., KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 79 (noting that in the 1960s, in order for a 
welfare recipient to exercise her fair hearing right, “a mother had to get time off from 
her job, if she had paid work, or find a babysitter”).  
190 Compare Mildred Rein, Determinants of the Work-Welfare Choice in AFDC, 46 SOC. 
SERV. REV. 539, 544 (1972) (“[T]he proportion of AFDC mothers who combine work 
and welfare has remained the same:  from 13 to 14 percent from 1961 to 1971.”), with 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES 
PROGRAM (TANF):  EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at IV-29 (2009), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/annualreport8/TANF_8th_Report_ 
111908.pdf (“The employment rate of adults receiving TANF cash assistance . . . has 
also increased significantly, up from less than one in five adults in Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 
to almost one of every three adults in FY 2006.”). 
191 See HANDLER, supra note 159, at 57 (“Work requirements for welfare recipients 
were a state and local concern until late 1967, when the federal government enacted 
the Work Incentive Program.”); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP:  
REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 64 (2008) (“In 1967, with the Work 
Incentive Program (WIN)—now known as workfare—the federal government revived 
work as a precondition of relief.”); Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as We Know It, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 471, 478 (1997) (“Since 1967, Congress has required states to condition AFDC 
benefits upon compliance with work requirements.” (footnotes omitted)).  The 
Supreme Court upheld the use of mandatory work requirements in 1973.  See N.Y. State 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 420-23 (1973) (holding that states are 
permitted to impose work requirements in addition to those imposed by federal law so 
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and the Family Support Act of 1988 placed additional emphasis on 
helping recipients transition from welfare to work.192  Nonetheless, pre-
1996 work requirements served largely symbolic functions without 
greatly affecting the experience of most recipients.193  
Since 1996, states have faced financial penalties if a minimum per-
centage of adult recipients do not engage in “work activity”194 for a 
federally specified minimum number of hours each year.195  Although 
the availability of caseload reduction credits enabled states to dodge 
the full impact of the federal work requirements between 1996 and 
2005,196 almost every state established or strengthened its own re-
quirements that welfare recipients work in exchange for their bene-
fits.197  And, because the caseload reduction credit benchmark was 
 
long as the additional requirements do not present a substantial conflict with the 
federal statute). 
192 See HANDLER, supra note 159, at 76-88 (discussing the Family Support Act’s work 
program, Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS)); MICHAEL B. 
KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE:  A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN 
AMERICA 307-09 (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing the debate over and ultimate passage of the 
Family Support Act).  Prior to 1996, the federal government also used the waiver 
process to indirectly express its growing preference for work requirements.  See Joel F. 
Handler, “Ending Welfare As We Know It”—Wrong For Welfare, Wrong for Poverty, 2 GEO. J. 
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 3 (1994) (“Many states, under waivers from the Reagan, 
Bush, and . . . Clinton Administrations . . . instituted work requirements . . . .”).  
193 See generally HANDLER, supra note 159, at 56-88 (surveying the history and impact 
of work requirements in American welfare policy). 
194 Federal law requires that recipients engage in one or more of twelve specified 
work activities.  See 42 U.S.C. § 607(d) (2006) (defining “work activities” to include 
employment, work experience, on-the-job training, job search and job readiness 
assistance, community service programs, vocational educational training, job skills 
training, education directly related to employment, secondary education, and the 
provision of child care services); see also Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 
1131, 1138-48 (2006) (discussing how TANF defines “work”). 
195 To be considered engaged in work for a particular month in fiscal year 2000 or 
thereafter, a recipient must participate in work activities for an average of at least thirty 
hours per week during that month.  42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(A).  If the recipient is a 
single parent with a child under age six, the participation requirement drops to an 
average of at least twenty hours per week.  Id. § 607(c)(2)(B).  A state may not reduce 
or terminate benefits if the recipient is a single parent with a child under six years old 
and the state determines that the recipient is unable to obtain needed child care.  Id. 
§ 607(e)(2). 
196 See supra subsection II.A.2. 
197 Indeed, approximately ninety percent of families receiving cash assistance 
through state welfare programs that are not governed by TANF’s work requirements 
(i.e., “separate state programs”) are nonetheless required by the state to work.  See U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 160, at 15; see also Michaels, supra note 126, at 
600-04 (arguing that state discretion over welfare policy is limited by the the substantive 
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reset beginning in 2006,198 states are again facing meaningful federal 
work requirements. 
As a result of PRWORA’s work requirements and the growing con-
sensus that welfare recipients should be required to work, the propor-
tion of welfare recipients who hold a job while collecting benefits has 
risen significantly.199  In its most recent report to Congress, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services reported that 32.5% of all 
families receiving TANF benefits in 2006 satisfied the federal work 
requirements, with an additional 14.4% engaging in work activities but 
falling short of the required number of hours.200  During this time pe-
riod, state work participation rates ranged from a high of 79.2% to a 
low of 13.1%.201  Of the families that met the work requirements, 
55.1% did so through “unsubsidized employment”—in other words, 
they worked in paid employment while also receiving welfare benefits.202 
Individuals who receive welfare while also holding a job face signif-
icant barriers to exercising their fair hearing right.  Fair hearings are 
held on weekdays during regular business hours.  Although the hear-
ing itself may not last very long, much of the day can be spent traveling 
to and from the hearing and waiting for it to begin.203  Because many 
low-wage workers have shifts that cannot be broken up, missing any 
part of the workday means that they lose their entire shift and wages 
they cannot afford to do without.  In addition, employers in low-wage 
sectors are not typically sympathetic to requests for time off, nor do 
 
federal goals of PRWORA, including the goal of facilitating the transition from welfare 
to work).  
198 Beginning in 2006, the caseload reduction credit benchmark was changed from 
a state’s 1995 caseload level to its 2005 caseload level.  See Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7102(a)(1)(B), 120 Stat. 4, 136-37 (2006) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 607(b)(3)(A)(ii)).  However, as previously described, 2009 legislation effectively 
excused states from the penalties.  See supra note 160. 
199 See supra note 190. 
200 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 190, at 19.  To count 
toward a state’s work participation rate, a family must include an adult or minor head-
of-household who is engaged in qualified work activities for at least thirty hours per 
week, or twenty hours per week if she has a child under the age of six.  Id. 
201 Id. app. 360 tbl.3:2.  
202 Id. app. 368 tbl.3:8. 
203 See, e.g., Vicki Lens, Confronting Government After Welfare Reform:  Moralists, Reformers, 
and Narratives of (Ir)responsibility at Administrative Fair Hearings, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 563, 
573 (2009) (noting that the wait for hearings to begin in one county “is unpredictable 
and, depending on how long each hearing takes, can be short or very long”).  
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they grant workers control over their schedules.204  Even having to 
explain to an employer why the time off is necessary exposes recipients 
to the stigma associated with welfare recipiency, which could diminish 
the employer’s confidence in the recipient and limit future employ-
ment opportunities.205  Thus, employed recipients who want to  
challenge the termination of their benefits are likely to face a dilem-
ma:  attending a fair hearing will not only cost them a full day’s pay 
and the expense of traveling to and from the hearing site,206 but may 
also place their jobs in jeopardy.  For many employed welfare recipi-
ents, these risks outweigh the value of whatever benefits they could win 
at the fair hearing.207 
2.  Reduced Access to Legal Services Undermines  
the Right to a Fair Hearing 
The circumstances facing welfare recipients have also changed 
since the 1970s insofar as recipients now find it nearly impossible to 
obtain free legal representation for a fair hearing.  Goldberg guaranteed 
that welfare recipients be permitted to appear with counsel at a fair 
hearing,208 but not the right to be provided counsel by the govern-
 
204 See KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE:  PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 98 (2011) (“Since the jobs [welfare recipients] can 
obtain are marginal, they do not have control over what their schedules will be.”). 
205 Super, supra note 102, at 853 (“Workers . . . may be more vulnerable to stigma if 
identified as recipients of means-tested benefits since they could face fairly immediate, 
concrete consequences:  the loss of their employers’ confidence and the opportunities 
that go with it.”). 
206 See id. at 832-34 (positing a hypothetical to demonstrate the substantial costs 
associated with attending hearings). 
207 See Super, supra note 89, at 1088 (“Working claimants may lose more in wages 
(and their employer’s good will) by attending [a fair hearing] than they would win 
from a successful result.”).  The value of the benefits recipients could win at the 
hearing has also diminished since Goldberg in light of the sharp decline in the real value 
of welfare grants.  A recent report summarized the decline: 
In all but two states, [cash assistance] benefit levels are now below 1996 levels, 
after adjusting for inflation, and these declines came on top of even larger de-
clines over the previous quarter century; between 1970 and 1996, cash assis-
tance benefit levels for poor families with children fell by more than 40 percent 
in real terms in two-thirds of the states. 
IFE FINCH & LIZ SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TANF BENEFITS 
FELL FURTHER IN 2011 AND ARE WORTH MUCH LESS THAN IN 1996 IN MOST STATES 1 
(2011) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/11-21-11pov.pdf. 
208 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970). 
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ment.209  Welfare recipients therefore generally have two options:  at-
tempt to secure free representation from a legal services office or ap-
pear pro se.210  Although there was never a time when all welfare 
recipients who sought a lawyer were able to find one, the availability of 
free legal representation for fair hearings has diminished in recent 
decades, with major consequences for the effectiveness of the right to 
a fair hearing. 
Goldberg held that due process was satisfied by an adversarial, legal-
istic procedural safeguard—the fair hearing—at a time when the avail-
ability of free legal services was increasing and fair hearing represen-
tation was considered central to the work of legal services lawyers.211  
Although the federal government had only begun funding legal ser-
vices for the poor in 1965,212 by 1970, the year Goldberg was decided, the 
Supreme Court could reasonably anticipate that legal services funding 
would continue to grow.213  In fact, that is exactly what happened dur-
ing the decade after Goldberg.  Despite being subject to much political 
 
209 See id. at 270 (“We do not say that counsel must be provided at the 
pretermination hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an 
attorney if he so desires.”).  Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion in Goldberg, asserted 
that even though the majority decision “requires only the opportunity to have the 
benefit of counsel at the administrative hearing, . . . it is difficult to believe that the 
same reasoning process would not require the appointment of counsel.”  Id. at 278 
(Black, J., dissenting).  That prediction has not come true. 
210 It is exceedingly rare for private attorneys to handle welfare fair hearings, either 
for a fee or pro bono.  See Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor:  The Problem 
of Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1573 (2002) 
(“[L]awyers looking for a good profit margin dismiss the poor as potential clients.”); 
Super, supra note 89, at 1094 n.191 (“Although a substantial number of lawyers and law 
firms engage in pro bono representation of low-income people, few are attracted to, or 
are immediately competent to handle, cases involving complex public-benefit 
programs.”). 
211 See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM:  THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 188-89 (1974) (detailing the growth of legal 
services between 1965 to 1972).  Despite this growth, at the time Goldberg was decided, 
the Nixon administration was seeking to cut funding for legal services.  See id. at 278-79 
(noting that “more money for poor people seems antithetical to the Nixon policies” 
and that the legal services movement had entered a new phase of “survival”). 
212 See id. at 39-70 (tracing the origins of federal funding for legal services).  The 
now-defunct Office of Economic Opportunity controlled the federal funding of legal 
services until 1974, when responsibility for coordinating the federal government’s 
involvement in legal services was shifted to the Legal Services Corporation.  See ALAN W. 
HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE 
FOR ALL:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 19-22 
(2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0158.pdf. 
213 See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 212, at 11 (“The legal services budget grew 
slowly but steadily from the initial $25 million in 1966 to $71.5 million in 1972.”). 
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wrangling during the 1970s, legal services funding increased steadily 
until reaching its high-water mark in 1981, when the Legal Services 
Corporation (LSC) for the first time met its “minimum access” goal of 
two full-time lawyers for every 10,000 poor people.214  Since then, fed-
eral legal services funding has fallen well below that goal,215 with the 
deepest cuts occurring in 1982216 and 1995.217  The most recent appro-
priation was $404.2 million,218 a far cry from the $750 million that 
would reflect the 1980 allocation adjusted for inflation,219 and far less 
still than if the appropriation were adjusted for both inflation and the 
larger number of poor people living in the United States.  
As the overall availability of free legal services has declined, legal 
services programs have shifted their resources away from representing 
welfare recipients at fair hearings and toward other legal issues affect-
ing low-income individuals.  In 1983, 5.4% of LSC programs’ closed 
cases involved AFDC or “other welfare” programs;220 that portion 
 
214 Id. at 24.  That year, Congress allocated a record $321.3 million to the LSC, 
funding 325 programs that operated in 1450 neighborhood and rural offices 
throughout all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
Micronesia, and Guam.  Id.  
215 Lisa Brodoff, Lifting Burdens:  Proof, Social Justice, and Public Assistance Administrative 
Hearings, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 133 (2008) (“[F]ederal grants to 
provide civil legal services to low-income clients have been drastically reduced over the 
last twenty-five years . . . .”).  
216 The decline in funding was most dramatic in 1982, when Congress’s 25% cut to 
LSC’s budget resulted in the closing of 285 legal services offices and layoffs of 1793 
attorneys and 952 paralegals.  Id. at 133 n.13 (citing LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2003–2004 
ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2004), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/ 
pdfs/LSC_20032004_Annual_Report.pdf). 
217 See Super, supra note 89, at 1094 (“In 1995, the new Republican majority in 
Congress slashed legal services’ funding . . . .”); Zietlow, supra note 119, at 39 (explaining 
that in the mid-1990s, “Congress ha[d] drastically cut funding to the LSC”). 
218 Press Release, Legal Serv. Corp., House Proposal Would Cut Civil Legal Aid by 
$104 Million ( July 6, 2011), http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/house-proposal-
would-cut-civil-legal-aid-104-million.  The House Appropriations Committee recently 
announced a proposal that would cut LSC funding by 26% for Fiscal Year 2012, rolling 
back LSC funding to a level not seen since 1999.  Id. 
219 Marcia Coyle, For LSC, a 30-Year Funding Rollercoaster, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 14, 2011, 
at 13.  Despite the focus on LSC-funded legal services, it must be noted that overall 
funding for civil legal assistance has evolved since the 1970s.  As of 2010, the nation’s 
civil legal assistance system was funded at $1.5 billion, approximately two-thirds of 
which came from nonfederal sources.  See ALAN HOUSEMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
THE JUSTICE GAP:  CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TODAY AND TOMORROW 7 (2011) available at 
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/justice.pdf.  However, very little of the 
nonfederal funding is used for welfare hearing representation.  See id. at 3 (not including 
welfare among the major catagories of assistance providers of civil legal aid offer). 
220 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 1984 FACT BOOK, at 17 (1984).  
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dropped to 3.5% in 1995,221 and in 2010 only 1.9% of closed cases 
involved TANF and state and local income-maintenance-related pro-
grams.222  And although already miniscule, the 2010 figure overstates 
the availability of free legal representation for welfare fair hearings:  
less than one-twelfth of the TANF cases closed during that year  
involved representation at a hearing or in court.223  Thus, as David 
Super recently observed, the overall decline in legal services funding 
and the shifting priorities of legal services programs means that repre-
sentation at welfare fair hearings has been “claiming a declining share 
of a shrinking pie.”224 
As a result of these changes in legal services funding and priorities, 
the proportion of welfare recipients who appear at fair hearings with-
out a lawyer is higher than was anticipated in 1970.225  This decline in 
the availability of legal representation at fair hearings undermines the 
effectiveness of the right to a fair hearing and weakens its capacity to 
serve as a meaningful procedural safeguard.226  Although fair hearings 
are less formal than full-blown trials,227 recipients who do not have ac-
cess to legal counsel must overcome numerous barriers in order to suc-
cessfully advocate for themselves at a hearing.  For example, pro se 
recipients must navigate complex and opaque procedures228 and make 
 
221 LEGAL SERVS. CORP.,  FACTS 1996, at 15 (1997).  
222 See LEGAL SERVS. CORP.,  FACT BOOK 2010, at 24 (2011). 
223 Id. at 21.  The vast majority of cases involved what LSC refers to as “counsel and 
advice” or “limited action,” neither of which includes representation at a hearing.  Id.  
224 Super, supra note 89, at 1095. 
225 See Brodoff, supra note 215, at 133 (asserting that cuts to legal services funding 
since 1980 have left welfare recipients “virtually without representation in the 
administrative hearing process”); see also id. (“The vast majority of clients who disagree 
with the state or federal agency’s decision to cut, deny or eliminate benefits must face 
the agency alone, put on evidence, argue the law—in sum, make their case to the 
judge.”). 
226 Cf. Jan L. Hagen, Justice for the Welfare Recipient:  Another Look at Welfare Fair 
Hearings, 57 SOC. SERV. REV. 177, 184 (1983) (“Petitioners who retained counsel were 
more likely to use the available due process procedures, particularly cross-examination 
and the presentation of arguments.” (citations omitted)).  
227 Cf. Friendly, supra note 42, at 1299 (“After the usual litany that the required 
hearing ‘need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial,’ Mr. Justice Brennan 
proceeded to demand almost all the elements of one.” (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 266 (1970))). 
228 See, e.g., Brodoff, supra note 215, at 149 (“[T]he administrative hearing process 
is difficult for appellants to navigate.  It can be a scary, intimidating, and complex 
process that involves court-like procedures, public speaking, motion practice, entry of 
exhibits, objections to evidence, and an understanding of complicated laws and 
procedures.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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sense of an array of welfare laws, regulations, and policies.229  At the 
same time, they must contend with the effects of poverty, including 
poor health or disability, lack of access to transportation or childcare, 
poor nutrition, little education, and inadequate housing.230  Many  
post-Goldberg recipients also must overcome a lack of English language  
fluency.231  Despite the resourcefulness and tenacity of many welfare 
recipients, it comes as no surprise that recipients who proceed without 
counsel at a fair hearing are much less likely to successfully challenge 
erroneous deprivations.232 
C.  New Technology 
The changes in technology that have reshaped American society in 
so many ways since the 1970s have also affected the procedural safe-
guards available to welfare recipients.  At the time Goldberg was decid-
ed, automation was not part of the day-to-day administration of welfare 
programs.233  Caseworkers made eligibility determinations by hand and 
all records were kept in paper files.  When welfare recipients chal-
lenged benefit terminations at fair hearings, the welfare agency could 
produce the relevant documents for review by the recipient or the 
judge prior to or during the fair hearing.  If the documents did not 
 
229 See, e.g., id. at 153 (“[P]ublic benefits law is so complex that it is virtually 
unreadable by the lay person.”); Lens, supra note 66, at 35 (“Welfare rules are complex, 
and unknotting bureaucratic mistakes out of the typical agency’s mound of rules, 
directives, and manuals can be extremely difficult.”); Super, supra note 89, at 1096 
(stating that public benefits programs have become so complex and discretionary that 
“claimants are in no position to challenge [agency actions]”). 
230 See, e.g., Brodoff, supra note 215, at 150; Lens, supra note 66, at 35 
(“Discrepancies may exist between clients’ educational and literacy levels and the skills 
needed to navigate the fair hearing process.”); cf. Mashaw, supra note 100, at 812 
(arguing that is it unrealistic to imagine a claimant will be “prepared to fight city hall 
even when basic entitlement to benefits is at issue”). 
231 See, e.g., Brodoff, supra note 215, at 151-52 (“Even assuming excellent translation 
services, unrepresented non-English speaking applicants can have difficulty 
understanding the administrative hearing system, the law that applies, and how to 
present their case.”). 
232 See Zietlow, supra note 119, at 39-40 (“Statistics show that poor people are more 
likely to prevail in hearings if they are represented by counsel . . . .” (citing Zietlow, 
supra note 130, at 1114 nn.13-15)).  But cf. D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos 
Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance:  What Difference Does Representation 
(Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June 2012) (manuscript at 49-
67), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708664 (arguing that previous attempts to 
measure representation effects provide virtually no credible quantitative information 
on the effect of an offer or actual use of legal representation). 
233 Super, supra note 89, at 1123. 
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provide the necessary information, the recipient’s caseworker or an-
other agency representative could be called to testify in order to ex-
plain the challenged decision. 
During the decades since Goldberg, new technologies have been in-
tegrated into many aspects of the administration of welfare pro-
grams.234  Many state and local welfare agencies now use computer 
systems to streamline application procedures and eligibility determina-
tions, improve fraud prevention and detection, and reduce the stigma 
associated with receiving welfare benefits.235  In some welfare agencies, 
computers are not just assisting caseworkers with the processing of 
cases; they are actually deciding who receives benefits and in what 
amounts.236  
Despite its many advantages, increased reliance on technology is also 
changing how welfare is administered in ways that threaten recipients’ 
ability to successfully challenge erroneous terminations at fair hear-
ings.  Merely identifying the rules and policies that were applied in a 
given case can be difficult, as complex computer programming and 
coding may hide the legal basis for eligibility determinations.  As a re-
sult, recipients, judges presiding over fair hearings and even the agen-
cy’s own representatives may be unable to evaluate whether the 
determination was erroneous. 237  
In addition to obscuring the legal basis for welfare agency deci-
sionmaking, highly automated welfare systems can also create new 
sources of factual errors.  For example, New York City’s welfare agency 
 
234 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1249, 1267 (2008) (observing that “agencies today increasingly use computer systems to 
make decisions”). 
235 See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, supra note 204, at 40, 56-59 (discussing the use of 
technology for welfare fraud prevention); Kennedy, supra note 86, at 251 
(“Technology . . . promises to transform the welfare system.  Advocates of mass 
technological innovation promise foolproof fraud prevention mechanisms, accurate 
and uniform distribution of benefits through EBT systems, and faster and easier 
procedures to claim benefits.”); Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand 
Inquisitor:  The Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 663, 692-93, 708-09 (2005) (discussing use of “computer-
matching” systems to verify welfare eligibility). 
236 See Super, supra note 89, at 1123 (stating that due to the adoption of highly 
automated systems, “eligibility workers [are] not in fact making most of the important 
decisions relating to claimants’ eligibility”).  
237 See Citron, supra note 234, at 1300 (“[A] system’s design may create unreviewable 
problems for individuals.”); see also Super, supra note 89, at 1124 (“Although policymakers 
and line staff may assume that the system is carrying out the same policies expressed in 
the program’s state plan and manuals, deviations may be difficult to detect.”). 
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uses a central computer system to track recipients’ attendance at vari-
ous appointments—if a recipient is found to have intentionally failed 
to appear at just one appointment, state law requires that he or she be 
penalized with a loss of benefits for a specified period of time.238  Ra-
ther than having caseworkers record when recipients miss an ap-
pointment, however, the central computer system automatically deems 
recipients to have willfully failed to attend all appointments unless a 
caseworker affirmatively enters a note in the system that the recipient 
appeared as requested.239  Pursuant to this method of administration, 
known as “autoposting,” all errors in the system run against the recipi-
ent rather than the welfare agency, and recipients are often faced with 
losing benefits despite having attended an appointment, or having 
been excused by the caseworker, because the caseworker failed to rec-
ord the attendance or excuse in the computer.240   
The shift toward automated eligibility determinations undermines 
important assumptions that were central to the Goldberg Court’s under-
standing of fair hearings.241  Without clear articulation of the legal 
basis for an agency’s decision to terminate benefits, it is difficult to see 
how a recipient can successfully challenge the decision at a hearing.  
Moreover, the veneer of rigor and precision associated with automated 
decisionmaking makes it exceedingly difficult for recipients to dispute 
the legal and factual determinations made by computer systems.242  
Thus, as Danielle Keats Citron has argued, “the procedural guaran-
tees of the last century have been overmatched by the technologies 
of this one.”243  
 
238 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 342 (McKinney 2003). 
239 Hearing on N.Y. State’s TANF-Funded Welfare to Work Program Before the Assemb. 
Standing Comm. on Soc. Serv., 231st Sess. 4-5 (N.Y. 2008) (testimony of Susan Welber, 
Staff Att’y, Legal Aid Society), available at http://www.legal-aid.org/media/69500/ 
finaltestimony11_20.pdf. 
240 Id.; see also Neil deMause, Documents Reveal Gaps In City Welfare Data, CITY LIMITS 
( Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.citylimits.org/news/articles/4278/documents-reveal-gaps-
in-city-welfare-data (describing the risk of autoposting errors). 
241 Citron, supra note 234, at 1281-88. 
242 See id. at 1283 (arguing that “automation bias” may cause judges to be unduly 
deferential to determinations made by automated systems). 
243 Id. at 1258. 
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D.  New Facts and Circumstances Create Needs  
for Additional Procedural Protections 
The new facts and circumstances discussed in this Part, and their 
impact on the right to a fair hearing, give rise to four types of new 
procedural needs experienced by today’s welfare recipients.  First, 
there is a need for some kind of prehearing process that can identify 
and overturn proposed benefit terminations that are not supported by 
the facts or the law.  This need emerges from the increased likelihood 
of erroneous terminations resulting from post-Goldberg incentives to 
shrink welfare caseloads.244  In addition, by overturning erroneous 
terminations without a formal hearing, such prehearing processes 
would reduce the need for legal representation and ameliorate prob-
lems related to the inaccessibility of fair hearings for recipients who 
hold a job.  
Second, there is a need for increased transparency with respect to 
welfare agency decisionmaking, particularly when the agency seeks to 
terminate benefits based on automated determinations.245  Welfare 
agencies’ increased reliance on computer systems to keep track of in-
formation about recipients and to make eligibility determinations 
generally occurs behind a veil of unintelligible computer codes and 
programming.  Thus, when welfare agencies seek to terminate benefits 
based on the decisions of a computer system, clear explanations of the 
rules and policies underlying those decisions are necessary in order to 
ensure that the fair hearing right is a meaningful one. 
Third, there is a need for flexibility with respect to the scheduling 
of fair hearings.  With a higher proportion of welfare recipients hold-
ing jobs while collecting benefits, limiting fair hearings to regular 
business hours renders hearings inaccessible for many recipients who 
are dutifully complying with their welfare work requirements.246  For 
these recipients, a meaningful procedure is one that does not force 
them to choose between attending a hearing and keeping their job.  
And fourth, there is a need for modifications to the fair hearing 
process that will enable recipients to participate meaningfully without 
legal representation.  With no real hope of a court-ordered right to 
 
244 See supra Section II.A. 
245 See supra Section II.C. 
246 See supra subsection II.B.1. 
Parkin FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)  4/10/2012 5:59 PM 
1360 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1309 
 
counsel at welfare fair hearings,247 and little reason to believe that legal 
services funding will increase to the extent necessary to enable most 
welfare recipients to be represented by counsel at fair hearings,248 the 
vast majority of recipients facing benefit terminations will do so with-
out the assistance of a lawyer.  For the right to a fair hearing to be an 
effective procedural safeguard against erroneous deprivations, the fair 
hearing process must become more accessible to recipients who do 
not have access to legal counsel. 
As a result of the various types of changes discussed in this Part, 
today’s welfare recipients will likely experience some or all of the four 
needs identified above.  The following Part examines the capacity of 
procedural due process to adapt to these changes and explores some 
possible procedural innovations that respond to the needs these 
changes have created. 
III.  ADAPTABLE DUE PROCESS:  HOW DUE PROCESS CAN RESPOND  
TO CHANGING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
Despite numerous changes in the facts and circumstances related 
to welfare terminations since the 1970s, little attention has been paid 
to whether the demands of procedural due process should adapt to 
those changes.  Considering the adaptability of due process raises two 
distinct questions.  First, what does due process doctrine say about the 
viability of procedural due process precedents when the facts and cir-
cumstances related to a particular deprivation have changed?  And 
second, what are possible additional or substitute procedural safeguards 
that might be appropriate if existing procedures must be adapted to 
new realities?  This Part takes up those questions in turn and then con-
cludes by considering the limits of procedural due process. 
A.  Adaptation and Due Process Doctrine 
The world is constantly changing, and at least some of those 
changes are likely to be relevant to the fact-intensive Mathews balanc-
 
247 See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516-17 (2011); Benjamin H. Barton & 
Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 967, 970 (2012) (“Turner dealt a death blow to hopes for a federal civil 
Gideon.”).  But cf. Stephen Loffredo & Don Friedman, Gideon Meets Goldberg:  The Case 
for a Qualified Right to Counsel in Welfare Hearings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 273, 307-12 (2009) 
(arguing that state legislatures have an independent constitutional duty to recognize and 
fund a qualified right to appointed counsel in welfare hearings). 
248 See supra subsection II.B.2. 
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ing approach to procedural due process.  Yet the Supreme Court has 
not addressed the question of when procedures that satisfied the de-
mands of due process in the past may be rendered unconstitutional by 
changes in the facts and circumstances related to a deprivation.  Not-
withstanding the existence of any such changes, the Court’s due pro-
cess precedents, however outdated, remain good law, and government 
agencies continue to regard them as binding.249  
Because the Court has not been presented with challenges to exist-
ing procedural due process precedents based on changed facts and 
circumstances, due process case law does not address how courts 
should handle such challenges.  Two recent district court decisions in 
New York expose this lack of guidance.  As discussed in this Article’s 
Introduction, Huggins v. Pataki and Mayers v. New York Community Ban-
corp involved due process challenges to New York State debt collection 
procedures that the Second Circuit had found constitutional approx-
imately twenty years earlier in McCahey v. L.P. Investors.250  The plaintiffs 
in both cases argued that the Second Circuit’s decision in McCahey was 
no longer binding because intervening changes in facts and circum-
stances had altered the balance of the Mathews factors, and, therefore, 
the district court was required to redo the Mathews analysis and deter-
mine the constitutionality of the procedures based on the new infor-
mation.251  The district judge in Huggins refused to reevaluate the 
Mathews factors in light of the new facts and dismissed the case.252  
Three years later, however, the district judge in Mayers disagreed with 
his colleague and proceeded to engage in a full Mathews analysis, tak-
 
249 Continued adherence to procedures dictated by prior due process precedents 
might be explained by the existence of statutes or regulations that implemented those 
precedents.  See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 358-5.0 to 358-5.11 (West, 
Westlaw through 2011) (outlining welfare fair hearing procedures in New York).  But it 
is also true that legislatures and agencies have not attempted to rewrite such statutes 
and regulations.  
250 See supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text. 
251 See Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., No. 03-CV-5837, 2005 WL 2105810, at 
*12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (“Plaintiffs contend that since the McCahey decision in 
1985, changes in technology which have enabled the electronic transfer of funds allow 
banks ‘to quickly and easily determine if an account contains only exempt money prior 
to restraining it,’ without any kind of pre-seizure notice to the debtor.”); Huggins v. 
Pataki, No. 01-CV-3016, 2002 WL 1732804, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002) (“Huggins 
does not dispute this reading of McCahey.  He argues, however, that intervening 
changes in technology have undermined the rationale for the McCahey decision, and 
that it is therefore distinguishable.”). 
252 See Huggins, 2002 WL 1732804, at *4 (“McCahey is binding authority, and I am 
obligated to apply that authority.”). 
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ing into consideration the changes alleged by the plaintiffs and hold-
ing that the plaintiffs stated a due process claim notwithstanding the 
existence of the McCahey decision.253   The conflicting reasoning and 
outcomes in Huggins and Mayers underscore the need for guidance on 
whether and how procedural due process precedents should be 
adapted to our changing world.   
Although the Supreme Court has not been faced with a similar type 
of due process challenge, the Court’s general approach to procedural 
due process claims offers clues as to what due process would demand 
in such a situation.  Indeed, as discussed below, current due process 
doctrine strongly suggests that requiring procedural safeguards to 
adapt to changing facts and circumstances is faithful to the Court’s 
understanding of the dictates of procedural due process. 
The notion that the requirements of due process may evolve over 
time has deep roots in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  As early as 
1884, the Court rejected the argument that the Framers’ understand-
ing of the Due Process Clause limits the scope of procedures required 
by the Clause.254  As Justice Felix Frankfurter later explained, the con-
cept of due process is, “perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law—
the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social 
standards of a progressive society.”255  Indeed, procedural rules, “even 
ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due process.”256  
 
253 See id. at *13-14 (holding that the new facts alleged by the plaintiffs altered the 
second and third factors of the Mathews balancing test). 
254 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884) (expressing fear that 
establishing a fixed definition of due process “stamp[s] upon our jurisprudence the 
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians”). 
255 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  According to Justice Frankfurter: 
“[D]ue process” cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any 
formula.  Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, 
and more particularly between the individual and government, “due process” is 
compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confi-
dence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess.  Due process is 
not a mechanical instrument.  It is not a yardstick.  It is a process.  It is a deli-
cate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by 
those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.  
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
256 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 630 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring 
in the judgment).  Although history creates a strong presumption of continued validity, 
“the Court has the authority under the [Fourteenth] Amendment to examine even 
traditionally accepted procedures and declare them invalid.”  Id. at 628 (White, J., 
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Thus, “due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical concep-
tion with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”257  
More specifically, the Court has long held that “due process is flex-
ible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situa-
tion demands.”258  Consistent with this understanding of due process, 
the Court evaluates challenged procedures on a case-by-case basis, with 
the constitutionality of the procedures dependent on the facts of the 
situation.259  Since 1976, the three-factor balancing approach adopted 
by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge has supplied the framework for re-
viewing the constitutionality of particular procedural safeguards.260  In 
addition to the three factors, the Mathews Court noted that due pro-
cess requires procedures to be “tailored, in light of the decision to be 
made, to ‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be 
heard,’ to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to pre-
sent their case.”261   Considered alongside the Mathews factors, the tai-
loring requirement further reinforces the fact-specific nature of the 
procedural due process inquiry. 
Although the Court has not had an opportunity to reconsider post-
Mathews procedural due process rulings in light of changing circum-
stances, it has addressed similar concerns in areas of due process that 
 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 186, 206 (1977)); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) 
(“[The] constitution [was] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to 
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” (emphasis omitted)). 
257 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 334 (1976)). 
258 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).  As the Court noted in Morrissey, 
“It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority 
that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.”  Id.; see also supra note 1. 
259 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (“[W]e generally have declined 
to establish rigid rules and instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the 
sufficiency of particular procedures.”). 
260 424 U.S. at 334-35 (1976).  But cf. United States v. James Daniel Good Real 
Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 66 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (stating that the Court did not adhere to “the notion that the Mathews balancing 
test constitutes a ‘one-size-fits-all’ formula for deciding every due process claim that 
comes before the Court” (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992))). 
261 424 U.S. at 349 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970)).  The 
Court first recognized the need for tailoring in Goldberg, where it explained that 
procedures must be “adapted to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients.”  
397 U.S. at 267; see also White, supra note 97, at 878 (discussing the Goldberg Court’s 
“willingness to probe beneath formalist assumptions, to inform itself about the realities 
of poor people’s lives”). 
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are not governed by Mathews.  In the realm of personal jurisdiction, for 
example, the Court’s precedent evolved from Pennoyer v. Neff 262 to In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington263 based in part on the need to adapt 
personal jurisdiction rules to changes in the circumstances of liti-
gants.264  This evolution is likely to continue as the rise of Internet-
based communication calls into question the ongoing constitutionality 
of decades-old personal jurisdiction rules.265  Other changes in due 
process doctrine may also be understood as responses to changed cir-
cumstances rather than simple reversals of precedent.266   
In sum, the Court’s consistent invocation of the flexibility of due 
process provides strong doctrinal support for requiring that procedur-
al safeguards adapt to changing facts and circumstances.  To be sure, 
the Court’s rejection of a one-size-fits-all approach to due process has 
come in the context of reaffirming the general proposition that due 
process can require different procedures for different types of depriva-
tions.  As such, the Court has left unaddressed whether due process 
 
262 See 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).  The Court held that a court can exert personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident only if that party is served with process while physically 
present within the state or that party’s in-state property had been attached at the 
beginning of the litigation.  Id.  The Court further explained that court proceedings “to 
determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no 
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”  Id. 
263 See 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that due process requires only that an 
individual have “certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’” (quoting 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).  
264 The Court explained this shift in Hanson v. Denckla:   
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, 
the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase.  
At the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made 
the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome.  In response to 
these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents 
have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff to the flexible standard of 
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.  
357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (citations omitted). 
265 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World:  Voice Over 
Internet Protocol and the Coming Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1481, 1542 (2006). 
266 For example, one might explain the Court’s reversal of its position on whether 
public employment is a property right protected by due process as influenced by the 
growth and regularization of public employment between 1961 and 1985.  Compare 
Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961) 
(holding that public employment can be revoked without a hearing), with Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985) (holding that public employees 
possess a property right in continued employment). 
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can require different procedures for the same type of deprivation oc-
curring at a different time under different circumstances.267  Any un-
certainty about how courts should handle such due process challenges 
will remain until the Court is asked to revisit one of its existing proce-
dural due process precedents and reevaluate the Mathews factors based 
on changed facts and circumstances.268  Until then, the Court’s prece-
dent concerning the flexibility of due process and the need for consid-
eration of the “time, place and circumstances”269 as well as the 
“capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,”270 and its 
requirement that the opportunity to be heard be “at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner,”271 weigh in favor of an approach to pro-
cedural due process that requires adaptation to changed facts and cir-
cumstances. 
B.  Identifying Forms of Additional or Substitute Procedural Safeguards 
Once due process is understood to require reconsideration of exist-
ing procedural due process precedents, courts must then determine 
what additional or substitute procedures would satisfy due process in 
the new, changed circumstances.  In the welfare context, the changes 
 
267 A related question is whether the requirements of procedural due process vary 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular person who is seeking to 
challenge a deprivation, or if those requirements ought to be standardized with respect 
to all persons challenging that deprivation.  For an example of one answer, see Owen 
M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 801-03 (1990), which argues 
that the Court’s approach must systematically consider the welfare system as a whole.  
The Court’s rulings have not answered this question in a consistent fashion.  Compare 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1977) (explaining that the level of process 
due is based on the typical case), with Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 
(1981) (requiring analysis of the facts of each individual case to determine the 
requirements of due process).   
268 To the extent that revisiting procedural due process precedents may raise stare 
decisis concerns, such concerns do not appear to be particularly relevant in this 
context.  Due process challenges of the type described here will be based on facts that 
are distinguishable from those previously considered.  Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that its decision to overrule a prior case may be informed by 
“whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed 
the old rule of significant application or justification.”  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 
393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
269 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 334 (1976)). 
270 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970). 
271 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
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identified in Part II of this Article suggest that the risk of erroneous 
termination has increased substantially since the 1970s, while at the 
same time welfare recipients now have a more difficult time using fair 
hearings to challenge those terminations.  Thus, there appears to be a 
need for additional procedural safeguards that are tailored to the cur-
rent realities of welfare programs and welfare recipients. 
In order to respond directly to the new facts and circumstances dis-
cussed in Sections II.A through C, this Section is organized according 
to the new procedural needs created by those changes and identified 
in Section II.D.  Although some of the procedures discussed below are 
likely beyond the scope of what a court could or would order as part of 
a Mathews analysis, nothing would prevent a welfare agency from 
adopting the procedures.  Indeed, to the extent that the procedures 
reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation, they could insulate a state 
from liability in a future due process challenge. 
1.  Pre–Fair Hearing Procedures 
Adoption of prehearing screening and informal dispute resolution 
procedures could relieve much of the pressure to overturn erroneous 
terminations that is currently borne by the fair hearing system.272  Such 
procedures could involve the welfare agency affirmatively reaching out 
to the recipient after the agency decides to terminate benefits, rather 
than merely assuming that the basis for the termination is correct and 
then waiting to see if the recipient requests a fair hearing.273  The pur-
 
272 Despite the appeal of using prehearing informal dispute resolution procedures 
to screen out erroneous terminations, some scholars have argued that relying on such 
procedures to resolve disputes may disadvantage the poor.  See, e.g., Lens, supra note 66, 
at 53 (“[C]aution is warranted for using alternative and less formal procedures for 
resolving disputes within the welfare center.  Such procedures may work against poorer 
and more disadvantaged clients, who may lose procedural protections that compensate 
for their lack of power.”); cf. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:  Minimizing 
the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1396 
(describing how informal processes allow the state to exercise coercive power over the 
poor who would otherwise be protected in formal proceedings); Owen M. Fiss, Against 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (arguing that poor litigants suffer from a 
power imbalance in negotiations). 
273 This has long been the general rule with respect to applications for food stamp 
benefits.  See 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d)(1) (2011) (“If there is any question as to whether the 
household has merely failed to cooperate, as opposed to refused to cooperate, the 
household shall not be denied, and the agency shall provide assistance . . . .”); id. 
§ 273.2(c)(5) (defining the “assistance” required by 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d)(1) to include a 
notice informing the household of, among other things, the state agency’s 
“responsibility to assist the household in obtaining required verification”).   
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pose of this contact would be twofold:  to determine if the recipient in 
fact willfully failed to comply with the rules, and, if so, whether the re-
cipient will agree to come into compliance immediately. 
Such a prehearing procedure was implemented in Tennessee start-
ing in January 1998.  This process—known as Customer Service Review 
(CSR)—arose after Tennessee’s welfare caseload shrank by almost 
thirty-eight percent in the year following enactment of the 1996 
federal welfare law.274  Concerned that this reduction was attributable 
to widespread caseworker error and recipient misunderstanding,  
lawyers at the Tennessee Justice Center contemplated legal action 
against the state welfare agency.275  However, rather than bring a law-
suit, they negotiated with state officials to create the CSR process, 
which required each proposed welfare case closure or sanction to be 
subject to an independent review before the agency could withhold 
benefits from a recipient.276  The goal of the CSR process was to avoid 
erroneous terminations of benefits, to better inform recipients of pro-
gram rules, and to give recipients another opportunity to comply with 
the rules.277    
Under the CSR process, impartial reviewers278 first checked to see 
whether the case file included sufficient documentation to support the 
caseworker’s recommendation that benefits be terminated.279  If the 
file lacked sufficient documentation, the case remained open and was 
returned to the eligibility worker.280  If the reviewer verified that the 
case file supported the termination of benefits, the reviewer then con-
tacted the recipient in order to explain the reasons for the proposed 
case closure, find out from the recipient why she failed to comply with 
 
274 Russ Overby, Customer Service Review:  Tennessee’s Review Process Before Welfare 
Reform Cases Are Closed, WELFARE NEWS (The Welfare Law Ctr., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 
18, 1998, at 7. 
275 APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., WORTHWHILE WELFARE REFORMS 2 (2001). 
276 Id. 
277 See Overby, supra note 274, at 8.   
278 Id.  The reviewers were initially Tennessee Department of Human Services 
supervisors, but the process was later turned over to “contract employees hired by four 
state universities in Tennessee on a regional basis, with overall training conducted by 
the School of Social Work at the University of Tennessee.  Contract employees [were] 
not subject to the supervision of the local offices whose cases they review[ed].”  Id. 
279 Id.  Several types of proposed case closures were not included in the review 
process, including cases that were closed due to excess income or resources, recipients 
moving out of state or dying, children of recipients becoming too old to qualify, and 
children “already receiving cash assistance with another caretaker.”  Id. at 7. 
280 Id. at 8. 
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the program requirements, and ask the recipient if she was willing to 
come into compliance with those requirements.281  If the recipient 
complied with the rules within fourteen days, benefits were not termi-
nated.282  Recipients who still did not comply had their cases closed but 
were also sent a notice informing them of the reasons, how they could 
regain benefits, and the availability of emergency welfare assistance.283   
Although Tennessee discontinued the CSR process in 2006,284 it 
posted impressive results while it was operational.  Based on a two-year 
sample, customer service reviewers were able to reach about half of all 
recipients threatened with case closure, and two-thirds of those recipi-
ents avoided the closure by coming into compliance with the rules.285  
Even when a reviewer could not reach the recipient, reviewers over-
turned one-third of the intended case closures because there was in-
sufficient support for closure in the case file.286 
New York has also adopted a prehearing procedure for certain wel-
fare cases, but the procedure differs from Tennessee’s approach in 
ways that undermine its ability to avoid erroneous terminations.  Wel-
fare agencies in New York must automatically begin an informal dis-
pute resolution process called “conciliation” whenever they decide to 
reduce or terminate benefits due to a failure to comply with the work 
rules.287  The agencies first mail a letter to the recipient informing her 
of the alleged violation and her right to participate in a conciliation 
meeting.288  The meeting is then held at a central welfare office, and 
the goal is to determine whether the failure to comply with the work 
 
281 Id. 
282 Id.  This time period could be extended if it was “not possible to demonstrate 
compliance within 14 days.”  Id. 
283 Id. 
284 UNIV. OF TENN. COLL. OF SOC. WORK OFFICE OF RESEARCH & PUB. SERV., 
2005–2006 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2006).  In its place, the Tennessee welfare agency 
created an in-house “Closure Review Team,” which assumed some of the functions CSR 
staff previously performed.  Id.   
285 Super, supra note 102, at 882 & n.197. 
286 Id. 
287 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 341 (McKinney 2003). The Family Support Act of 1988 
required an attempt at conciliation prior to imposing a welfare sanction, but that 
requirement was repealed by PRWORA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 682(h) (1994) (repealed 1996) 
(“Each State shall establish a conciliation procedure for the resolution of disputes 
involving an individual’s participation in the [Job Opportunities and Basic Skills 
Program].”). 
288 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 341.1(a). 
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rules was “willful and without good cause.”289  If the recipient establish-
es good cause and demonstrates that the failure was not willful, the 
sanction cannot be imposed; however, if good cause is not established 
or if the recipient does not attend the conciliation meeting, the agen-
cies issue a notice informing the recipient that her benefits will be re-
duced or terminated due to the failure to comply with the rules.290  In 
2010, New York City’s welfare agency claims that more than half of the 
conciliation meetings attended by the recipient resulted in resolution of 
the issue with no loss of benefits.291  Without information about the re-
cipients who do not attend their conciliation meetings,292 however, it is 
difficult to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the process. 
The prehearing procedures adopted by Tennessee and New York 
have the potential to counteract some of the features of today’s welfare 
system that undermine the effectiveness of the right to a fair hearing.  
Yet these procedures have important differences that bear upon their 
capacity to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivations.  In Tennessee’s 
CSR process, the reviewer made contact with the recipient by tele-
phone and provided information and asked questions in an attempt to 
resolve the problem.  In contrast, the New York conciliation notice 
mailed to the recipient includes little information other than a recita-
tion of the failure to comply and information about the recipient’s 
right to conciliation.  In addition, unlike the CSR process, conciliation 
meetings require in-person attendance, which makes it more difficult 
for recipients with jobs or childcare obligations to participate.  The 
conciliation meetings also differ in the possible outcomes.  Whereas 
the CSR process allowed for resolution based on a promise to comply 
immediately with the rules, conciliation meetings do not, excusing 
noncompliance only if good cause is shown.  Finally, Tennessee’s use 
of customer service reviewers who were independent from the welfare 
agency created a level of impartiality that is missing from New York’s 
 
289 Id.; see also Fair Hearings:  Overview, COMMUNITY SERVICE SOC’Y, http:// 
benefitsplus.cssny.org/pbm/advocacy/fair-hearings/203135#203137 (last visited Feb. 
15, 2012) (describing New York City’s conciliation process for resolving work-related 
welfare issues).   
290 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 341.1. 
291 See deMause, supra note 240 (quoting New York City Human Resources 
Administration Commissioner Robert Doar’s statement that “in conciliation, during 
the course of the past year, the majority of [cases] resulted in the agency being able to 
settle the matter with no penalty to the client”). 
292 According to the agency, it does not track the percentage of recipients that fails 
to attend the conciliation meeting.  Id. 
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conciliation process, which is staffed by employees within the same 
agency that is seeking to terminate the recipient’s benefits. 
2.  Transparency Regarding Automated Determinations 
Decisions to terminate benefits made by welfare agencies’ computer 
systems do not need to be shrouded in secrecy.  Agencies could take 
an important step toward transparency simply by ensuring that their 
computer systems “generate audit trails that record the facts and rules 
supporting their decisions.”293  These audit trails could include a com-
prehensive history of all decisions made in the case, including the 
identities of the agency officials who created the factual record.294  
Providing audit trails to welfare recipients at the time they are notified 
of a decision to terminate their benefits would enable recipients to see 
the reasons supporting the automated determination, decide whether 
to challenge the determination, and prepare for a fair hearing.  Audit 
trails would also make it easier for judges presiding over fair hearings 
to assess the legality of challenged decisions, and could potentially 
counteract the automation bias that can influence some judges.295 
3.  Flexible Scheduling of Fair Hearings 
Accommodating working welfare recipients who are unable to ex-
ercise their right to a fair hearing because they are afraid of losing 
their jobs is fairly straightforward:  change the way fair hearings are 
scheduled.  There is no reason that all fair hearings must be held 
Monday through Friday, during regular business hours; indeed, some 
civil court systems have adopted evening or weekend sessions.296  Allow-
ing recipients to request evening or weekend hearings would enable 
some recipients to appear at fair hearings when they otherwise would 
 
293 Citron, supra note 234, at 1305. 
294 Id. 
295 See id. at 1305-06 (“By providing a detailed map of a computer’s decision-making 
process, audit trails would encourage [hearing] officers to critically assess the 
computer’s specific findings.”).  Citron also proposed two strategies to combat 
automation bias more directly.  “First, agencies should make it clear to hearing officers 
that automated systems are fallible.”  Id. at 1306.  “Second, agencies should require 
hearing officers to explain, in detail, their reliance on an automated system’s decision.”  
Id. at 1307. 
296 For example, New York City’s small claims courts are in session during evening 
hours one day a week.  See New York City Civil Court Small Claims Part:  Civil Court Schedule 
and Service Changes, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ 
nyc/smallclaims/courtservicechanges.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).   
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not be able to do so.  And even if holding fair hearings outside the 
traditional workweek would be too administratively burdensome, per-
mitting recipients to identify days or times they are unavailable and 
scheduling hearings accordingly would increase the likelihood they 
will appear at their fair hearings and take full advantage of their due 
process rights. 
4.  Procedures That Are Accessible to Pro Se Recipients 
There are many ways that a welfare agency could make fair hear-
ings more accessible to pro se recipients.  An agency could ensure that 
recipients are provided user friendly information about the rules and 
procedures governing the proposed termination of their benefits and 
the fair hearing itself.  Along those lines, an agency could designate 
ombudspeople to help recipients understand the reasons for the im-
pending termination and how to navigate the fair hearing system.297  A 
welfare agency could create materials for pro se recipients that provide 
much the same information,298 or allow outside organizations to oper-
ate pro se help desks in welfare offices or at hearing sites.299  Making 
such resources and information available would mitigate the need for 
recipients to consult with lawyers in order to figure out whether the 
 
297 See Diller, supra note 61, at 1216 (suggesting an ombudsman system); cf. 
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1816 (2001) (“All 
jurisdictions should have comprehensive services such as free or low-cost workshops, 
hotlines, court-house advisors, and walk-in centers that provide personalized 
multilingual assistance at accessible times and locations.”). 
298 See, e.g., RICHARD ZORZA, THE NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE SELF-
HELP FRIENDLY COURT:  DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE 
WITHOUT LAWYERS 49 (2002), available at http://www.zorza.net/Res_ProSe_SelfHelp 
CtPub.pdf (advocating for provision of accessible, user friendly information to pro se 
litigants); Cantrell, supra note 210, at 1581 (discussing pro se assistance programs, 
including printed self-help manuals and web-based information centers). 
299 This type of pro se assistance for welfare recipients challenging terminations or 
reductions of benefits already exists in New York City.  Since 2001, the state agency that 
administers welfare fair hearings has permitted Project FAIR, a coalition of legal 
services attorneys, community advocates, and law students, to staff a help desk at the sole 
hearing location in the city.  See History, PROJECT FAIR, http://www.projectfair.org/ 
history.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).  Advocates had previously tried to establish 
help desks in the waiting rooms of New York City–run welfare offices, but the city 
barred the advocates from entry and a First Amendment challenge to the city’s 
restrictions proved unsuccessful.  See Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 
F.3d 133, 139-40, 151 (2d Cir. 2004) (determining that welfare office waiting rooms are 
nonpublic fora and the exclusion of an organization without official business is 
reasonable). 
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agency’s decision is correct and whether they should request a fair 
hearing.  
Welfare agencies could take advantage of technological advances 
that have rendered some prehearing procedures far less costly than 
they were in the past.  In jurisdictions that use electronic case file sys-
tems to store information pertaining to a welfare case, agencies could 
create an Internet-based mechanism for recipients to review infor-
mation relevant to the agency’s proposed termination of benefits.300  
Making this information available online would enable recipients to 
learn the basis for the termination and decide whether to request a 
fair hearing.  This access would also enable recipients to better pre-
pare for fair hearings, thereby reducing erroneous deprivations. 
It is also possible to modify the fair hearing itself in ways that make 
it more accessible to pro se recipients.  For example, the burden of 
proof on welfare agencies could be heightened in order to reduce the 
risk of erroneous deprivation.301  When terminating benefits, agencies 
typically must prove that the decision is supported by a preponderance 
of the evidence.302  In order to uncover deprivations that are not sup-
ported by the record, but which pro se recipients are unable to combat 
at the hearing, agencies could be held to a more stringent “clear and 
convincing” standard.  Requiring the agency to prove each element of 
its case beyond the traditional “preponderance of the evidence” stand-
ard would place an extra burden on welfare agencies, thereby reduc-
ing the risk that benefits would be terminated erroneously.303 
The federal food stamp program already uses this type of burden 
shifting in some situations.  Federal law requires states to follow specific 
 
300 Although many welfare recipients likely do not have Internet access in their 
homes, most can visit public libraries or other locations that offer free access.  See, e.g., 
SAMANTHA BECKER ET AL., OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL:   HOW THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 
BENEFITS FROM INTERNET ACCESS AT U.S. LIBRARIES 19 (2010), available at http:// 
www.imls.gov/pdf/OpportunityForAll.pdf (“Public library computers have become a 
critical resource for many underserved populations and for others who do not have 
access to the Internet and computers through other means.”). 
301 Outside the welfare context, the Mathews balancing test has been used to strike 
down a “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof and replace it with a 
“clear and convincing evidence” standard in proceedings to terminate parental rights 
for neglect.  See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982). 
302 See, e.g., Brodoff, supra note 215, at 175 (explaining that the “traditional” level of 
proof required at welfare fair hearings is a “preponderance of the evidence”). 
303 See id. (arguing that adopting a “clear and convincing” standard for welfare fair 
hearings would ensure that “only those who are clearly ineligible for benefits would 
lose them”). 
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procedures when prosecuting “intentional [p]rogram violations,” or 
food stamp fraud.304  Included in these procedures is a fair hearing at 
which the presiding judge must make findings on each element using 
a standard that requires clear and convincing evidence.305  This height-
ened standard of proof places an additional burden on agencies, but it 
serves as an extra safeguard against erroneous determinations.  
The role of the judge at welfare fair hearings is another target for 
procedural reforms designed to assist pro se recipients.  Rather than 
passively waiting for a pro se recipient to present his or her case or re-
spond to the agency representative’s presentation of the facts and the 
law, the judge could play a more inquisitorial role.306  Such a role could 
take a variety of forms.  For example, the judge could be required to 
explain to the recipient the basis for the termination and possible de-
fenses, or to develop the record by asking the recipient a series of 
questions probing whether any defenses might be available or whether 
there is some other reason why the termination is erroneous. 
The Supreme Court has already endorsed the idea that due process 
may require judges to assume an active role in legal proceedings in-
volving unrepresented parties, albeit outside the context of welfare fair 
hearings.  The Court has long required that judges in civil proceedings 
evaluate pro se parties’ pleadings using a less stringent standard than 
 
304 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e) (2011). 
305 See id. § 273.16(e)(6) (“The hearing authority shall base the determination of 
intentional [p]rogram violation on clear and convincing evidence which demonstrates 
that the household member(s) committed, and intended to commit, intentional 
[p]rogram violation . . . .”). 
306 See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 42, at 1289 (proposing experimentation with an 
investigative or inquisitorial system in which an impartial administrative law judge 
assumes “a much more active role with respect to the course of the hearing; for 
example, he would examine the parties, might call his own experts if needed, request 
that certain types of evidence be presented, and, if necessary, aid the parties in 
acquiring that evidence”); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented 
Poor:  Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 
2028 (1999) (identifying the need for a judge to be “as active as necessary” to ensure a 
just outcome in cases involving pro se litigants); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality 
in the Market for Justice:  Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why 
Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 977-78 (2004) (arguing 
that “judges should be active umpires,” policing procedural errors that limit the court’s 
access to relevant evidence and cogent arguments); see also Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring 
Access to Justice:  The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in 
New York City’s Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659, 670-76 (2006) 
(reviewing proposals to require active participation of judges to mitigate challenges 
faced by pro se litigants). 
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that applied to pleadings submitted by represented parties.307  And the 
Court’s most recent procedural due process ruling held that judges 
must take on new roles and responsibilities in order to protect the due 
process rights of unrepresented parties in particular situations.   
In Turner v. Rogers, decided at the close of the 2010 Term, the 
Court, applying Mathews, rejected a claim that the Due Process Clause 
automatically requires the provision of counsel at civil contempt pro-
ceedings for an indigent individual facing incarceration for failing to 
pay child support to a child’s unrepresented custodian.308  In reaching 
this holding, the Court explained that due process does not require a 
categorical right to counsel as long as the state provides  “‘substitute 
procedural safeguards,’ which, if employed together, can significantly 
reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”309  In Turner, 
these alternative procedures included giving the pro se defendant 
more information about the “critical issue” to be decided at the hear-
ing, using a form to collect information about that issue, giving the 
defendant an opportunity to respond to questions about the issue at 
the hearing, and requiring the judge to make an express finding on 
that issue.310  Thus, the Court’s reasoning in Turner provides new sup-
port for reconceptualizing the role of the judge at welfare hearings.311  
 
307 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (stating that “a pro se 
complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less stringent standards than 
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’” (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 
(1972))); cf. FED. R. EVID. 614 (enabling a court to call and interrogate witnesses); id. 
706 (enabling court to appoint an expert of its own selection). 
308 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011). 
309 Id. at 2519 (citation omitted) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 
(1976)). 
310 The Court identified the following four alternative procedural safeguards:   
(1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the con-
tempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant 
financial information from him; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for the de-
fendant to respond to statements and questions about his financial status (e.g., 
those triggered by his responses on the form); and (4) an express finding by 
the court that the defendant has the ability to pay.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
311 Turner’s reliance on judges to assure that individuals’ due process rights are 
vindicated has prompted skepticism.  See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers:  A 
Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 78, 159-61 (2011) (observing that “the Turner rule is oddly incomplete” because 
“enforcement depends on and returns contemnors to the very judges who dealt with 
them too hastily”). 
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C.  Reckoning with the Limits of Procedural Due Process 
Even if welfare agencies were to implement each of the procedural 
innovations discussed above, the possibility remains that the resulting 
procedural safeguards would fail to prevent erroneous deprivations of 
benefits in the majority of cases.  In other words, there might be no 
way to supplement the welfare fair hearing right in a way that effectively 
roots out erroneous deprivations.  If that is the case, then it seems that 
the focus of procedural due process should shift to an earlier stage in 
the welfare termination process in order to prevent erroneous depriva-
tions before they are even proposed. 
To be sure, procedural due process is not usually concerned with 
the initial decision to deprive an individual of a constitutionally pro-
tected interest.  This is based on the assumption that meaningful pro-
cedures exist for individuals to defend themselves against erroneous 
deprivations.  But when no such procedures exist, as may turn out to 
be true in the current welfare context, due process arguably requires 
more.  Goldberg itself lent support to such an expansive vision of due 
process when it emphasized that due process procedures must be “tai-
lored to the capacities and circumstances” of welfare recipients.312  As 
Jerry Mashaw has argued, “The logical and limited extension of that 
principle is that when due process cannot be assured by trial-type hear-
ings, additional or different techniques for assuring fairness become 
appropriate.”313 
What such alternative techniques might look like could vary con-
siderably.  To address the types of technology-driven errors that arise 
in highly automated systems, Danielle Citron has suggested that due 
process should require agencies to regularly test a system’s software.314  
Addressing caseworker errors would not be so straightforward.  The 
procedural due process scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s is instruc-
tive on this point.  Only a few years after Goldberg was decided, scholars 
began to argue that adversarial, trial-like procedural safeguards would 
never be effective, especially for beneficiaries of subsistence programs 
 
312 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970). 
313 Mashaw, supra note 100, at 810. 
314 See Citron, supra note 234, at 1310 (“Agencies should maintain testing suites that 
run expected and unexpected hypothetical scenarios designed by independent policy 
experts through decision systems to expose distorted policy. . . . Testing protocols 
should be run before a system’s launch, during implementation, and every time 
policies change.”). 
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such as welfare.315  According to Jerry Mashaw, writing in 1974, what 
was needed was a management system for assuring accurate and timely 
processing and adjudication of welfare claims, sometimes called a 
quality control or quality assurance system.316  For Joel Handler, writing 
twelve years later, the answer was an informal, cooperative system that 
would exist side by side with the traditional due process system.317  
Both of these approaches represent major shifts in our understanding 
of procedural due process.  Depending on whether and how the 
requirements of due process adapt to the facts and circumstances of 
today’s welfare programs and welfare recipients, as well as the success 
of such adaptation, it might be time to reconsider these approaches to 
procedural due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Change is inescapable and, in the context of procedural due pro-
cess, change matters.  By examining the evolution of welfare during 
the forty years since the Supreme Court announced the right to a fair 
hearing in Goldberg v. Kelly, this Article has shown how changes in the 
facts and circumstances of a property deprivation can affect the 
Court’s fact-intensive approach to procedural due process.  Such 
changes are not unique to welfare—the facts and circumstances of 
many of the procedural safeguards established since the due process 
revolution will evolve in ways that affect one or more of the Mathews 
factors in the years to come, if they have not already done so.  Yet the 
Supreme Court has not addressed whether and how due process can 
 
315 See HANDLER, supra note 70, at 7, 22 (arguing that procedural due process is 
“conceptually flawed” and that “reliance on the complaining client is virtually fatal”); 
Mashaw, supra note 100, at 775 (arguing that “the elements of fairness or fair 
procedure normally associated with due process of law in adjudicatory proceedings are 
inadequate to produce fairness in social welfare claims adjudications”). 
316 Mashaw, supra note 100, at 810-11.  Since Mashaw made this proposal, quality 
assurance systems have been adopted for the administration of food stamps, Social 
Security disability benefits, and veterans’ benefits, among others.  See, e.g., Casey & 
Mannix, supra note 142, at 1383-87 (discussing the design and harmful effects of public 
benefit quality control systems used in the 1980s).  More recently, states have 
experimented with new forms of diagnostic monitoring intended to improve agency 
performance by combining features of case-by-case adjudication with systemic review.  
See, e.g., Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State:  
Lessons from Child Welfare Reforms, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 542-48 (2009) 
(describing Alabama’s and Utah’s use of a “Quality Service Review” process to monitor 
child protective services programs). 
317 See HANDLER, supra note 70, at 143-53. 
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adapt to these types of changes.  This Article attempts to fill the gap by 
arguing that adapting the requirements of due process to new facts 
and circumstances is faithful to constitutional doctrine and necessary 
to ensure that existing procedural systems continue to provide due 
process of law.  Adapting due process protections to our rapidly chang-
ing world also provides an opportunity, decades after the due process 
revolution, to restart a conversation about procedural justice that went 
silent many years ago.  
